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I. INTRODUCTION
This article studies incentive mechanisms for business models of
electronic commerce and analyzes how incentive mechanisms affect
contractual arrangements by private lawmakers in the electronic commerce
field. Since the late 1990s, business people have paid more attention to the
term "business model,"and have acknowledged that creative business models
could expand their own businesses.' Some business people contemplated
creating a new market by utilizing information technology.2 Others desired
to make their businesses more efficient and less costly by using Internet
facilities, and therefore developed business models in the area of electronic
commerce.3 The proliferation of business model patents also triggered a pe-
rception of the importance of creating new business models by business-
people worldwide. After the United States Court of Appeals officially
recognized in 1998 that business model patents deserve patent protection
pursuant to the United States Constitution,' many business entities began
applying for business model patents. Some were successfully registered.5 In
I The advent of the Internet made business people realize the true importance of business
models. The Internet forced businesses to reconfigure their business models; it has changed the way
"millions of businesses shop for information, buy and sell goods and services, and participate in
discussions." JeffreyJ. Norton & Noah P. Barsky, Management Control Issues and Legal Concerns Surrounding
Business-to-Business E-Commerce: Transactions in the Electric Utility Industry, 21 J.L. & COM. 47, 63 (2001)
[hereinafter Norton & Barsky].
2 "Information technology's share of the U.S. economy nearly doubled between 1977 and 1998,
growing from 4.2 percent to 8.2 percent... Information technologies contributed more than a third of
real U.S. economic growth between 1995 and 1997." CAROLANN MEARES,JOHN F. SARGENT,JR., ET.
AL, THE DIGITAL WORKFORCE: BUILDING INFOTECH SKILLS AT THE SPEED OF INNOVATION 5 (June
1999), at http://www.ta.doc.gov/Reports/TechPolicy/digital.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
3 Electronic commerce "generally refers to contracts and payments made using computers and
other electronic equipment." Gregory E. Maggs, Regulating Electronic Commerce, 50 AM.J. COMP. L. 665,
665 (2002) [hereinafter Maggs]. The rise of electronic commerce has "enhanced the abilities of
companies to collect, store, transfer, and analyze vast amounts of data." Norton & Barsky, supra note 1,
at 63.
4 See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
5 See Jared Earl Grusd, Internet Business Methods: What Role Does and Should Patent Law Play?, 4
VA. J. L. & TECH. 9, para. 5 (1999). Grusd presented many examples of actual business model patents
registered during the dot-com boom such as (i) Cybergold's "pay-per-view advertising method," which
"may be able to block all methods in which users are offered pecuniary rewards for viewing Internet-based
advertisements;" (ii) Slashdot.org's patent concerning "certain aspects of playing three-dimensional games
on the Internet;" (iii) Open Market's "secure, real-time payment method over the Internet using debit
and credit cards;" (iv) Netcentives's "online frequent-buyer program;" and (v) Netdelivery's "proprietary
billing and cataloguing processes." Id. See also Teresa Riordan, A Dangerous Monopoly? Paying Computer
Users to Read InternetAds and Then Storing Their Data, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 1, 1999, at C2; Scott Thurm, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 9, 1998, at B 1; See generally Nicole-Marie Slayton, Internet Business Model Patents: An Obvious
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1999, Amazon.corn obtained a U.S. patent for the one-click online shopping
process that places purchase orders via a communications network.6
Priceline.com's reverse auction patent also caused a flutter.7 The patent
permits Priceline.com to exclude all other business methods in which a
buyer proposes a price for a product or a service and sellers bid to supply it.'
However, althoughHHH numerous Internet companies had funding at the
peak of the dot-corn boom, only a few business models were successful after
the burst of the IT bubble.9 Investors massively overestimated the speed at
which the marketplace would adopt dot-corn innovations.'0 Why did many
new business models disappear from the business world? What are the
common characteristics of the successful business model?
Answering these questions not only gives business people direction for
implementing new businesses, but also serves to develop a framework for
private contracting in the electronic commerce field. Business models are,
in a sense, products of parties' procedural mechanism of exchange because
business models primarily aim to give contracting parties incentives to reach
agreements. Successful business models provide contracting parties with an
efficient bilateral incentive to reduce transaction costs." At the same time,
Incentive to Reform the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 21 LOY. LA. ENT. L. REV. 123 (2000)
(discussing business model patents).
6 U.S. Patent 5,960,411 (issued Sept. 28, 1999), http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-
Parser?Sectl =PTO 1&Sect2 = HITOFF&d = PALL&p = 1&u =/netahtml/srchnum.htm&r = 1&f= G&I
=50&s1=5,960,411.WKU.&OS=PN/5,960,411&RS=PN/5,960,411. Thereafter, in district court,
Amazon.com successfully sued Barnesandnoble.com alleging patent infringement. See Amazon.com, Inc.
v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (W.D. Wash. 1999). Nevertheless, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the District Court's decision, and noted
that Barnesandnoble.com had "raised substantial question of invalidity" in regards to the patent at issue.
Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc. 239 F.3d 1343, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
7 U.S. Patent 5,794,207 (issued Aug. 11, 1998), http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-
Parser?Sectl = PTO1&Sect2 = HITOFF&d= PALL&p = l&u =/netahtml/srchnum.htm&r= l&f= G&l
= 50&sl =5794207.WKU.&OS=PN/5794207&RS=PN/5794207.
8 See Peter H. Lewis, Web Concern Gets Patent For Its Model Of Business, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10,
1998, at D1.
9 See, e.g., Miguel Helft, Business; StillAlive and Growing Online, Without Fanfare, N.Y. TIMES,Jan.
6, 2002, at Section 3.
10 See id. Helft notes:
[w]hile scores of e-commerce companies have vanished, online retailing continues to grow,
and shoppers increasingly expect off-line stores to have online branches. Yet for many
traditional retailers, the Internet has been little more than a costly headache.... ITIraditional
chains-including Target, Wal-Mart and Macy's and Bloomingdale's, the Federated
Department Stores units-have scaled back, restructured or canceled online efforts.
Id.
In the economic literature, scholars have developed an economic model of contractual
relationship in which the primary purpose is to economize on transaction costs. See, e.g., Oliver E.
164 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:161
the incentive mechanisms incorporated in business models are closely linked
to relational theory of private contracting.1 2 If drafting costs are so cost-
effective, and legally enforceable terms addressing contingencies enable
contracting parties to achieve efficient allocation of surplus at the stage of
legal enforcement, contracting parties may simply rely on a mechanism of
legal-enforcement. Where legal enforcement is robust, non-legal incentive
devices are not necessarily needed. On the other hand, if contingencies are
so unknown or so complicated that drafting legally enforceable terms might
not be cost effective, contracting parties are likely to abandon drafting
discrete contracts and instead adopt an incentive mechanism.
Accordingly, while this article makes an intensive analysis of electronic
commerce business models and their incentive mechanisms, it primarily has
two goals. The first goal is to show the close relationship between particular
types of contracts and business models. Business models are classified into
two types according to which costs, ex ante or ex post, are emphasized as a
cost-engineering target. 13 The first type presupposes that contracting parties
are able to draft specific terms and conditions, either online or offline, to
respond to anticipated contingencies and enable legal enforcement. In the
world where the legal enforcement is cost-effective, contracting parties try
Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22J.L. &ECON. 233 (1979)
[hereinafter Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics]. Although these discussions have focused on a
transaction model where a promisee uses a bond or a hostage posted by a promisor, in most cases, a real
transaction is an exchange of assets where two or more parties exchange such bond or hostage bilaterally.
This article presumes that the examination of bilateral incentives, rather than a mere unilateral function
of each incentive, is necessary for the better understanding of the overall structure of real transactions.
See Avery Wiener Katz, Informality as a Bilateral Assurance Mechanism: Comments on Ronald Mann's "The Role
of Letters of Credit in Payment Transactions," 98 MICH. L. REV. 2554 (2000) [hereinafter Katz, Bilateral
Assurance] (discussing the bilateral assurance mechanisms in letters of credit due to the strong signal of
making the letter legally binding). For bonds or hostages, see, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commit-
ments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1983) [hereinafter Williamson, Credible
Commitments] (introducing the norm hostage, and describing the function of the hostage in relational
contracts).
12 Stewart Macaulay first identified that contract parties often prefer not to refer to their contracts
or legal sanctions when they settle disputes. Steward Macaulay, Non-Contract Relations in Business, 28 AM.
SOC. REV. 55 (1963). In the legal literature, Ian Macneil and other scholars have demonstrated a model
of relational contracts that do not easily fit the classical bargaining models. See, e.g., Ian Macneil, Contracts:
Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neo-Classical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw.
U. L. REV. 854 (1978); CharlesJ. Goetz and Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV.
1089 (1981) [hereinafter Goetz & Scott]; David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104
HARV. L. REV. 375 (1990) [hereinafter Charny].
13 In this article, ex ante transaction costs refer to transaction costs for making contracts (contract
specification costs or contract drafting costs) at the stage ofpre-contract negotiations. Expost transaction
costs refer to transaction costs incurred at the stage of contract performance, such as enforcement costs
and renegotiation costs.
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to minimize drafting costs as well as other administrative costs that arise in
the contract negotiation process. The first type of business model responds
to such requests of transactors to establish a standardized negotiation or
contract formation process with Internet devices. Alternatively, the second
type presupposes that contracting parties are unable to specify contingencies
because these contingencies are unknown, or even if they are known to
contracting parties, are too complicated to be specified efficiently in a
contract term. In the regime of extremely high contract specification costs,
contracting parties give up forming a discrete contract, and instead rely on
cost-effective self-enforcing mechanisms that offer informal norms to secure
the contract performance. The second type of business model is counter-
acted by requiring transactors to incorporate the bonding mechanism into a
standardized process of electronic commerce using the Internet. This article
will argue that due to the unique nature of electronic commerce, most of the
successful business models are categorized as the second type, which incor-
porates an incentive to enhance self-enforcement by transactors.
The second goal of this article is to reveal the uniqueness of informal
norms in electronic commerce. One of the unique natures of business-to-
consumer electronic commerce is that it has both high contract specification
costs at the contract negotiation stage and high enforcement costs, both legal
and non-legal, at the contract enforcement stage, even though other
administrative costs are significantly lower. Business models of electronic
commerce often require much stronger incentive mechanisms because they
are so unique. This creates two stages of informal norms. One is a weak
informal norm that mainly functions as a bond or hostage when contracting
parties desire to preserve their relationship.14  The other is a stronger
informal norm that mainly operates when contracting parties wish to settle
a dispute with intent to end their relationship, and works as a substitute for,
rather than a complement to, the weakness of legal enforcement. This article
will conclude that in electronic commerce settings, courts should be more
sensitive to the business models underlying the disputed transactions. In
cases where underlying business models emphasize creating incentive
mechanisms to enhance self-enforcement by contracting parties, courts
should use a formalistic interpretation of contract language as long as the
business models attain efficient allocation of formal and informal norms as
a result of incorporating incentives.
This article has three remaining parts. Part II sets out the analytical
framework. As an analytical framework, subsection A outlines the inter-
14 For a detailed classification of non-legal sanction using bond or hostage mechanisms, see, for
example, Charny, supra note 12, at 392-97 (classifying the non-legal sanction into three types: relation-
specific prospective advantages, reputation in the market, and social and psychic losses).
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relationship mechanism between business models and private contracting,
and subsection B describes the mechanism in which incentives in business
models create informal norms. Part III presents empirical analysis of
currently prevailing business models, and reveals how parties choose formal
and informal norms in contract formation under the influence of incentive
mechanisms underlying business models. In analyzing business models, a
new transactional classification of one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-
many, according to the potential number of players in a business model, is
also used as an analytical framework. Part IV summarizes the analysis and
offers a conclusion.
II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
A. Business Models and Private Contracting
The term "business model," although abstract and vague, "typically
describes a firm's unique combination of products or services, its legal and
financial structure, operations, supply chain to and from the firm,
transactional forms, terms of trade, marketing activities, management style,
and accounting systems." 5 However, since this article aims to discover how
business models affect private contracting in the electronic commerce
setting, the business model is viewed from the perspective of institutional
economics. 16 In this respect, the business model refers to a particular formal
and widely available structure of incentives that makes up the institutional
framework. More concretely, this article defines that the business model is a
unified and standardized process containing an incentive mechanism in
which two or more strangers seek to exchange assets, conduct negotiations,
reach an agreement, and finally execute asset exchange efficiently in
accordance with contract terms. This article assumes that such incentive
mechanisms are those that provide two unknown parties with efficient tools
to solve information asymmetry problems with the lowest transaction costs,
15 John W. Bagby, Business Method Patent Proliferation: Convergence of Transactional Analytics and
Technical Scientifics, 56 Bus. LAw. 423,445 (2000) (discussing various issues concerning a business methods
patent).
16 See generally Ronald J. Mann, Verification Institutions in Financing Transactions, 87 GEO. L.J. 2225
(1999) [hereinafter Mann, Verification Institutions in Financing Transactions] (stating that institutional
economics presumes that the supply and demand analysis cannot completely explain the economic
development, and claiming that efficiency of institutions will be an essential part of the success of a
business).
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which mainly consist of ex ante negotiation costs and ex post enforcement
(renegotiation and dispute resolution) costs."
The Internet's low barriers to conducting business enable parties to parti-
cipate in smaller transactions.18 Some argue that administration costs are
significantly lower in electronic commerce because of the Internet's global
nature. 19 Due to the globalization oflnternet transactions, contracting parties
in different countries can pursue international transactions more easily than
before the Internet existed. 20 However, while the nature of Internet trans-
actions increases the possibility of long-distance transactions, the transactions
do not necessarily reduce contract negotiation costs. Although the geogra-
phic openness of electronic commerce makes stranger-to-stranger trans-
actions more likely, the lack of face-to-face contact in the negotiation process
makes negotiation costs much higher when contracting parties wish to write
complete contracts. Contract negotiations need to be flexible and hetero-
geneous. When paper based transactions are implemented with long-
distance transactions, negotiations are mainly made by exchanging draft
contracts via communication devices like e-mail, telex, or facsimile. If con-
tracting parties wish to make their negotiation process more standardized and
automated through a Web-based electronic commerce interface however,
face-to-face or real time negotiations are no longer expected.
To illustrate how the lack of face-to-face contact or real time com-
munication makes negotiation costs much higher, suppose there is a simple
paper-based transaction in which a seller would like to sell a product to a
buyer. In the real world, the seller would first find potential buyers. One
might advertise his or her goods in public newspapers, while others might
obtain a list of potential buyers from an information source and send direct
mails for solicitation. The seller then selects a buyer and commences
negotiations. During negotiations, one party proposes a draft contract to the
other, and the party receiving the first draft reviews it and proposes a
counteroffer. Drafts undergo several revisions until the contract is finalized.
In general, the negotiation process for larger deals is likely to become
lengthier and more complicated. For example, in a typical acquisition agree-
ment, the owner of a target company, often in advance, submits information
memorandums to several potential buyers that detail the bidding process and
17 See generally id. (taking a similar approach in his observation of financial transactions and
explaining the informational verification mechanism in financing transactions).
18 Henry H. Perritt,Jr., Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace: Demand for New Forms ofADR, 15 OHIO
ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 675, 675 (2000) [hereinafter Perritt] (discussing the criteria for further
development of alternative dispute resolution (ADR)).
19 See id. at 675-76.
20 See id. at 675.
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its conditions. 21 After the bid opens, some of the bidders are short-listed and
the target's owner and the potential buyer begin negotiations by entering into
a non-binding letter of intent.
In contrast, electronic commerce negotiation is rapid and more standard-
ized. In many cases, no substantive negotiation occurs until executing the
standardized contracts. Parties first determine whether they should enter
into a transaction by considering information provided both online and
offline. While the rapid and standardized character of electronic commerce
substantially reduces direct administration costs, substantive contract nego-
tiations are more difficult. This means that transaction costs for executing
complete contracts (contract drafting costs) are relatively high.2 While real
time negotiation makes flexible contract drafting possible by reflecting oral
conversation into contract terms directly and instantly, parties under electro-
nic commerce usually do not conduct such real time negotiations.
Due to high drafting costs, contracting parties often encounter difficulty
in reaching discrete contracts. When contracting parties are unable to address
contingencies underlying the transaction in specific terms, they have
difficulty in seeking legal enforcement. Courts often interpret commitments
not addressed in the face of a contract as unenforceable, or at least the
commitments face uncertainty with court interpretation. Thus, contracting
parties must rely on alternative mechanisms of self-enforcement in which
informal norms mainly function to settle disputes expost. In a regime where
legal enforcement is not available, contracting parties must try to rely on
mutually trusting each other, but the level of trust is uncertain at the time of
forming a contract. A party faces the risk of opportunistic conduct, or rent-
seeking behavior of its counterpart. Since one party often encounters the risk
of the other party's rent-seeking in the regime of incomplete contracts,
contracting parties often establish a mechanism for the other party to promise
21 See, e.g., Dale A. Oesterle, The Law of Mergers and Acquisitions, American Casebook Series,
Westgroup 9-17 (2d ed.) (describing the M&A negotiation process).
2 In this respect, drafting costs differ according to type of transaction. For example, drafting
costs are minimal in a standardized business-to-consumer transaction where contingencies are highly
regulated by the background rules, including the Uniform Commercial Code. In such transactions,
businesses reduce the background rules to the printed-terms of agreements with minimal costs-although
it is still costly for consumers to read or modify such printed terms. For other types of agreements, mainly
in business-to-business transactions, contracting parties may face greater drafting costs when they want
to specify complex terms. However, such costs are not necessarily unbearable for businesses if the
transaction amount or volume is much greater as compared to drafting costs. This article presumes that
in the electronic commerce setting, drafting costs are relatively high-at least for businesses in business-
to-business transactions where flexible negotiations are sought, and for consumers in business-to-
consumer transactions, where consumers have no means of amending the printed-terms. For the brief
analysis of drafting costs, see Charny, supra note 12, at 403-04.
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not to engage in such rent-seeking behavior.23  In this context, incentive
mechanisms, in a sense, aim to fill a gap between formal legal norms and
transactional substance.
Even though parties successfully address all anticipated contingencies in
detailed contractual terms by creating in electronic commerce a standardized
system of efficient negotiation that significantly reduces drafting costs, lower
values of electronic commerce prevent legal enforcement because legal
enforcement expost is more costly than the value of a subject matter. Con-
tracting parties recognize that enforcement costs are often too high vis-a-vis
the value of transactions. The National White Collar Crime Center
("NW3C") showed that, for complaints reported to IFCC as fraud cases
from January 1 to December 31, 2004, the mean amount of loss was $894.26
and the median amount of loss was $219.56.24 NW3C estimates that "just
over 87.7% of all fraud complaints are related to the Internet or online
service."25 It is a crucial factor for successful business models to have suffi-
cient incentive tools to reduce anticipated ex post self-enforcement costs.
When contracting parties find it infeasible to resort to legal enforcement
because of high drafting costs, or even if the drafting cost problem was
solved, because of the lower-value problem, contracting parties in electronic
commerce then rely on an alternative self-enforcing mechanism.
However, electronic commerce often increases parties' self-enforcement
costs for many reasons. As electronic commerce often has its basis on long-
distance and stranger-to-stranger transactions, it encounters difficulty in
creating an efficient mechanism of reputation as a bond. Reputation works
well if it is disseminated to a particular community easily and quickly, and
there is a well-established system to monitor it,26 but electronic commerce
23 See Avery Wiener Katz, The Economics of Form and Substance in Contract Interpretation, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 496, 530-32 (2004) [hereinafter Katz, Form and Substance]. Generally, "rent seeking can
take place at the contract-writing stage." Id. at 531. If the contract is incomplete and thus more
substantive interpretation is required, contracting parties' options are either (i) to invest a substantial
amount of resources in prospective litigation to maximize the possibility of a favorable outcome or (ii) to
write a discrete contract where the slight productivity of such litigation expenditures are reduced,
minimizing the total litigation expenditure. Id. at 530-31. However, in the electronic commerce setting,
the investment resource for writing efficient terms of discrete contracts is limited, and thus standard form
contracts are used in most cases. Cf. id. Under the transaction where a party's standard contract form is
used, those who propose such standard form contracts "will be tempted to sneak one-sided but inefficient
terms into the contract." Id. Accordingly, contracting parties "would find it useful to have a way of
committing to abstain from such behavior." Id.
24 National White Collar Crime Center & FBI, IFCC 2002 Internet Fraud Report (Jan. 1, 2004 -
Dec. 31, 2004), available at http://www.ifccfbi.gov/strategy/2004_IC3Report.pdf (last visited April 11,
2005).
25 Id., http://www.ifccfbi.gcv/strategy/2004_IC3Report.pdf at 5.
26 For general discussions of reputational non-legal sanction mechanisms, see Charny, supra note
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often does not fulfill these two preconditions. Forming a community in
which reputation functions efficiently is often difficult due to the long-
distance and global nature of electronic commerce. Due to the stranger-to-
stranger nature of electronic commerce, one may not easily create a
transactor's reputation. For instance, auction site players generally deal with
each other in the regime where information is incomplete, or even if the
information is available, none may verify it. Further, stranger-to-stranger
deals in electronic commerce premise spot deals rather than repeat deals.
While in repeat deals a future transaction opportunity may function as a
relation specific bond, contracting parties in spot transactions generally have
no means to exchange a relation specific hostage solely for such one shot
transactions.
In sum, contracting parties in electronic commerce bear high transaction
costs for establishing both legal and non-legal enforcement mechanisms. In
the ex ante contract negotiation stage, electronic commerce's global and long-
distance nature and standardized, automated, and impersonal nature make
drafting costs much greater than those in paper-based transactions. In the ex
post enforcement stage, it then encounters the lower-value problem. Even if
electronic commerce successfully implements a system of reducing contract
specification costs, legal enforcement is not justified because litigation costs
do not outweigh the expected amount of recovery. Even though contracting
parties may decide to shift their contract regime to a more incomplete one,
they may encounter difficulty in creating efficient bonds because the long-
distance and the stranger-to-stranger natures make costs of creating bonds
much higher.
Business models are thus developed in order to solve the above
problems. This hypothesis suggests the following typology for business
models of electronic commerce. First, business models are classified accord-
ing to whether they seek legal enforcement by reducing drafting costs. In
this respect, most of the business models will fail to establish such drafting
cost reduction systems because the standardized, automated, and impersonal
nature of the interface makes it difficult to establish an effective structure of
contract negotiation and flexible drafting mechanisms. At most, only a
transaction that is highly standardized in the form of contracts, and in which
most contingencies are known, is eligible for creating such cost-effective
negotiation mechanisms. Letters of credit or bills of lading are probably the
most typical illustration. As these contracts are already highly standardized
and focal points of negotiation are pre-determined, these are more easily
incorporated into an automated system of business models without the
intervention of human discretion. Except for such rare cases, most of the
business models will fail to establish the regime of discrete contracts. In-
stead, the primary concern for businesses that operate Web site electronic
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commerce is how to implement effective self-enforcing mechanisms. In
order to achieve this goal, business models often require transactors to
exchange bonds or hostages that encourage the substantive performance of
27contracts. As discussed in Part III, operators of electronic commerce in-
vented various bonding mechanisms, such as credit card chargeback systems,
online payment mechanisms, electronic money, escrow services, and online
feedback systems.
Finally, if the business models already solve the problem of high self-
enforcement costs, they may be able to focus on minimizing other admini-
strative costs, such as delivery or transportation costs. In such business
models, the primary users may be those in relatively high value transactions
(anticipated litigation costs are relatively lower vis-a-vis the transaction value)
or those relational parties who desire to continue their business relationship
or engage in many similar transactions regularly, or those who expect to have
symmetric information ex post regarding the costs and benefits of perfor-
mance (renegotiation costs are expected to be lower).2 8 The typical example
of high value transactions is an electronic tender system implemented by a
government office or entity. Presumably, governmental electronic tender
systems primarily intend to reduce various administrative costs, including
contract specification costs, in connection with the tendering process.29 The
illustration of a two relational parties' transaction is a traditional EDI
platform, where the two parties' relationship already minimized litigation
risks and reduced renegotiation costs sufficiently before they went online.3"
Since relational parties, through their experience of similar transactions in
the past, may identify legal contingencies more easily, parties may be able to
address those contingencies in their EDI contracts on an offline, paper basis.
Further, since EDI transactions premise that repeat deals are a relation
specific asset exchange, business models do not require additional bonding
mechanisms online. Thus, the business models of EDI may focus exclu-
sively on minimizing other administrative costs, the reduction of which may
be achieved only by rapid and standardized processes using the Internet.
B. Bilateral Incentive Mechanisms and Informal Norms
Theoretically, contracting parties optimally choose formal and informal
norms in electronic commerce as well as in paper-based transactions. 31 In the
V See Williamson, Credible Commitments, supra note 11.
28 See Katz, Form and Substance, supra note 23.
29 See infra Part III.C.2.
30 See infra Part III.B.1.
3, See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent
Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765 (1996) [hereinafter Bernstein].
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contract interpretation of real world transactions, contracting parties allocate
aspects of their contracting relationship to formal, legal norms and informal,
non-legal norms.32 Non-legal sanctions, such as reputation bonds, are some-
times strong enough to ensure the substantive performance of counter-
parties, making legally enforceable contracts less necessary.
33
Suppose that a seller repeatedly sells machines to buyers and the seller
regularly accepts refunds out of concern for his reputation. The seller does
not desire to include in a contract a clause that the seller accepts any refund
because the clause may not give the buyer incentives to use the machine in
an appropriate manner. Contracting parties do not explicitly write the seller's
refund policy in their contract. Put another way, parties intentionally write
stricter contract terms, and the fair distribution of costs and benefits is
delegated to a flexible application of informal norms. Transactional sub-
stance is expelled out of the formal legal regime, and contracting parties
create non-legal norms to reflect any substance.
Similarly, in electronic commerce, contracting parties desire to achieve
optimal balance of formal and informal norms. However, since formal
norms are relatively weak in electronic commerce due to the difficulty of
contract enforcement, contracting parties must rely more intensely on infor-
mal norms than those in paper-based transactions. In other words, parties
must rely on a stronger incentive mechanism that creates stronger informal
norms.
1. BONDING MECHANISM
The most popular incentive mechanism is the use of bonds or hostages.34
This mechanism is triggered by poor contract performance and results in the
sacrifice of something valuable - a bond posted by that party.3S Two aspects
are noted. Ex ante, a contracting party tries to verify information asserted by
32 See id. at 1787-95.
33 See id. at 1787.
34 See Williamson, Credible Conmmitments, supra note 11 (describing the terms bonds and hostages).
35 See Charny, supra note 12, at 390-97. There are three types of bonds. The first type is the
relationship-specific prospective advantage, where a committing party (promisor) places a particular asset
under the control of the other party (promisee). The promisee will forfeit the asset when the promisor
breaches. The second type is a party's use of its reputation as a bond. The incentive mechanism is that
the promisor develops a reputation on which potential transactors may rely. "If the promisor improperly
breaches his commitments, he damages his reputation and thereby loses valuable opportunities for future
trade." Id. at 393. Third, the sacrifice of psychic and social goods can be a typical non-legal sanction. For
example, when a promisor breaches a contract, he may suffer from "loss of opportunities for important
or pleasurable associations with others, loss of self-esteem, feelings of guilt, or an unfulfilled desire to
think of himself as trustworthy and competent." Id. at 393-94.
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the counter-party and evaluate the transactional risks via the signal strengths
of the posted bonds. In this sense, bonding mechanisms function as an
essential tool for contracting parties' risk planning. This aspect is described
as an informational verification process, where the first order information
(e.g., the obligor's assertion that it has a sound financial standing) is often
verified by the second order information provided by a third party interme-
diary (e.g., an auditor's assertion that the obligor's financial information is
true and correct).36 On the other hand, an expost forfeiture of bonds is con-
sidered an informal sanction. Contracting parties are encouraged to perform
their contract obligation substantively or try to dissolve disputes faithfully for
fear of the sanction of losing a valuable asset. In this sense, bonding
mechanisms function most effectively when contracting parties desire to use
informal norms to resolve contract disputes without ending their trans-
actional relationship.
HardAssets as Bonds: A classical bonding mechanism is for an obligor to
post specific assets as collateral." By posting collateral, the obligor increases
his or her credibility and causes the creditor to have more faith in the obligor.
Collateral is classified further into the possessory secured transaction and the
non-possessory transaction.38
The typical possessory secured transaction is a pledge in which an obligor
posts collateral into the possession of a creditor. However, this possessory
type of collateral often does not function as an effective bond.39 For example,
suppose there is a sales transaction in which a seller is a highly reputed
manufacturer in sound financial condition and a buyer is an anonymous
individual consumer. In this transaction, posting a deposit as collateral to the
seller may work as a bond. Nevertheless, the deposit's function as a bond is
imperfect unless loss of the deposit imposes a significant loss to the buyer.
This type of collateral certainly reduces total risk exposure of sellers, but the
bond is often weak if the amount of the deposit is much smaller than the
transaction value. As long as the loss of collateral does not threaten an
obligor with significant losses, the collateral will not work effectively as a
bond.
Under the non-possessory secured transaction, an obligor retains the
possession of collateral and files it in public record so that third parties have
notice of the creditor's claim against the collateral40 The typical illustration
of the non-possessory secured transaction is a mortgaged loan, in which a
36 See Mann, Verification Institutions in Financing Transactions, supra 16, at 2231-32.
37 See id. at 2241-49.
38 See id. at 2242-43.
39 See id.
40 See id. at 2244.
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lender obtains a mortgage by use of a loan on the borrower's property.
Unlike the possessory secured transaction, the non-possessory secured
transaction enables collateral to function more effectively as a bond.41 A
creditor's threat to enforce collateral is an effective bonding device if the
subject of the collateral is an essential part of the obligor's business or per-
sonal life. 42 Thus, the non-possessory secured transaction is more popular
than the possessory secured transaction in the real transactional world. 3
However, even though a business can use such possessory or non-
possessory collateral as a bond, such use is significantly restricted and limited
in the field of electronic commerce. The main reason is that secured trans-
actions incur higher transaction costs in electronic commerce. In many
cases, both non-possessory and possessory secured transactions inevitably
require an additional offline procedure of posting collateral. Further, non-
possessory collateral is more complicated in its creation and thus is less
suitable to electronic commerce than possessory collateral, although non-
possessory collateral has more power as a bond. In most cases, non-posses-
sory collateral must be accompanied with some offline paper-based docu-
mentation, which may destroy the potential advantage of electronic
commerce that enables strangers to reach an agreement only via an online
process, while possessory collateral merely requires posting of assets.
Soft Assets as Bonds: While collateral is one of the typical hostages of
"hard" assets, information constitutes a "soft" type of hostage. Information
is more suitable to electronic commerce than collateral because transactors
are able to exchange information online at cheaper costs. If transactors
expect the information to work effectively as a bond, such information must
constitute reputation, the loss of which will cause a significant damage to an
obligor. Reputation functions as a bond to the extent that the failure of the
contracting party to perform contract obligations will seriously destroy the
party's reputation.
41 In this respect, a relation-specific investment is categorized as a deviation from non-possessory
collateral bonds, while the mere relation-specific investment does not legally function as collateral. A
relation-specific investment makes an obligor retain possession of the investment, but if an obligor
breaches a contract, the investment will lose value.
42 Cf. Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 929-30
(1986). The quality of the bond will generally affect the function of the bonding mechanism. An efficient
bond should constrain an obligor more strictly. Thus, collateral as a bond is more efficient when the
collateral posted is closely related to the obligor's business or personal life. In addition, the bond should
not tempt the creditor. If the assets posted as a bond can be readily resold, the creditor will have more
incentive to "induce breach, declare default, and sell the [assets]." Id. at 930.
43 See Mann, Verification Institutions in Financing Transactions, supra note 16, at 2243 (explaining
informational verification mechanism in financing transactions).
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In electronic commerce, reputation typically works in two cases. First,
a reputational capital ofan electronic commerce operator gives a strong signal
that the operator will perform its contract obligation substantively. Because
the operator's business heavily relies on such reputational capital developed
through historical achievement, the loss of the capital will seriously affect the
business's future operation. Second, information provided by financial
intermediaries or credit-related information providers often functions as a
reputational bond if the financial reputation is crucial for transactors to
maintain their operation, or for individual consumers to maintain their
funding source. In typical business-to-consumer transactions, a consumer's
credit history particularly functions as a reputational bond. If the consumer
fails to perform a contract substantively, failure is recorded in the consumer's
credit history. Bad credit history will affect a consumer's ability to obtain
sufficient credit in the future.
2. THE ROLE OF THIRD PARTY INTERMEDIATION
The previous subsection suggested that, for the purpose of relation-
specific asset exchange, an intangible soft asset of information was more
suitable to electronic commerce than the hard asset of collateral and, in order
for soft information to work as a bond, contracting parties often select a third
party as an intermediary with strong reputational signals. However, the
function of the third party intermediary is not limited to being a mere infor-
mation provider serving as a reputational intermediary. In fact, such a party
often operates as a direct risk absorber rather than a reputational interme-
diary. Contracting parties choose appropriate incentives from among the
multiple functions of a third party intermediary. For purposes of this article,
the mixture of the variety of incentive functions of a third party intermediary
is an intermediation.
A common intermediation scheme is the use of guarantees. Although it
is widely acknowledged that guarantees primarily have a guarantor bearing
the risks of an obligor as a risk absorber, the guarantee mechanism is more
complicated.44 Let's assume that the creditor's transaction costs are primarily
costs of monitoring the obligor (monitoring costs), and costs that the creditor
may recognize by multiplying the anticipated amount of loss when the
obligor is insolvent by the probability that such insolvency will occur (default
44 See, e.g., Avery Wiener Katz, An Economic Analysis of the Guaranty Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
47 (1999) [hereinafter Katz, An Economic Analysis of the Guaranty Contract] (outlining the basic economic
logic underlying the guaranty relationship, and applying the results to a variety of specific issues in
government policy and private planning).
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risk costs). 4  By the guarantee scheme, monitoring costs and default risk
costs vis-a-vis the obligor will, all or partly, shift to the guarantor. 46 The
creditor, in return, may incur additional administrative costs for selecting this
three-party guarantee scheme by either paying a guarantee fee (when the
guarantor hedges its costs to the creditor), or decreasing the interest rate
(when the guarantor hedges its costs to the obligor).47 Obviously the creditor
prefers the guarantee when the creditor's cost savings by shifting its monitor-
ing and default risk costs to the guarantor outweigh the creditor's additional
costs of having the guarantor undertake the obligor's obligation. To this
effect, the creditor's additional administrative costs for selecting a guarantee
rather than a single loan are closely linked to the degree of the addition of the
guarantor's costs for monitoring the obligor instead of the creditor, and the
guarantor's costs of bearing the obligor's default risk.48 More concisely, the
guarantee scheme is justified when and only when it achieves the three
parties' total cost reduction effect by shifting all or part of the creditor's costs
to the guarantor.
Two explanations are possible when the guarantee scheme has total cost
reduction effects. First, the guarantor may monitor the obligor more cost-
effectively than the creditor does. In this first scenario, the decrease of the
creditor's monitoring costs outweighs the increase of the guarantor's moni-
toring costs. Second, even if the guarantor does not monitor the obligor
effectively, the guarantor's financial commitment may function as a reputa-
tion bond that gives the obligor an incentive to comply with the contract
obligation. This significantly reduces the creditor's costs of default risks.
Even if the reputation of a guarantor, however, is so strong that a creditor
is satisfied with the guarantor's risk taking or even if the guarantor's commit-
ment constitutes a strong bonding mechanism that induces the obligor to
perform the contract substantively, the function of the guarantor as an
intermediary is still insufficient due to the unilateral function of the guaran-
tee intermediation. This means that a creditor may verify an obligor, but an
obligor may not verify an obligor. A guarantee scheme may fit well with a
simple loan. Once a loan is made by a creditor, only the creditor bears risks
underlying the loan. Indeed, most commercial loan agreements primarily
45 See id. at 65-68. In addition to monitoring costs and default risk costs, liquidity costs (costs of
obtaining liquid fund to lend) constitute an important component of transaction costs under the guarantee
scheme. In order to simplify the discussion, this article assumes that liquidity costs are minimal.
4 See id. at 68-69.
47 See id. at 69.
48 See id. at 68-70.
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focus on establishing monitoring mechanisms, like affirmative and negative
covenants, to prevent a moral hazard problem of the obligor.
4 9
Since sales transactions consist of bilateral rights and obligations, con-
tracting parties ask a third party intermediary to work bilaterally rather than
unilaterally. In order to deploy the bilateral bonding mechanism, contracting
parties often want a third party to intermediate sales transactions by being a
direct contract party to the sales transaction rather than merely being a
guarantor.50 In this "complete intermediation" model, the third party enters
into a purchase contract with the seller and simultaneously enters into a
back-to-back based contract with the buyer.5'
An intermediary absorbs contractual risks by dividing a sales contract into
two parts; one is between the seller and the intermediary, and the other is
between the intermediary and the buyer. In the complete intermediation
model, in other words, both the seller and the buyer may shift the target of
their monitoring and default risk costs to the intermediary. Similar to the
guarantee scheme, the complete intermediation is preferred only when the
shift of monitoring and risk targeting will decrease the total transaction costs
of the seller, the buyer, and the intermediary. Thus, an analysis of the effect
of cost shifting on each party's transaction costs is necessary. From the seller
or the buyer's perspective, the seller's (the buyer's) shift of monitoring and
risk target from the buyer to the intermediary will release the seller (the
buyer) from bearing costs of monitoring the buyer (the seller) and costs of
the buyer's (the seller's) anticipated default risks, and will assume additional
costs of monitoring the intermediary and costs of the intermediary's default
risk. From the intermediary's perspective, on the other hand, the inter-
mediary bears costs of monitoring the buyer and the seller and costs of the
seller's and the buyer's default risks. This simple model suggests that
contracting parties prefer the complete intermediation when (i) both the
seller and the buyer may be able to monitor the intermediary less expensively
than they may monitor each other, or more simply, costs of the inter-
49 For typical provisions in loan agreements for U.S. banks, see for example, Kenneth J.
Goldberg, Lender Liability and Good Faith, 68 B.U. L. REV. 653 (1988); Robert M. Lloyd, Financial Covenants
in Commercial Loan Documentation: Uses and Limitations, 58 TENN. L. REv. 335, 340-43 (1991).
50 See Ronald J. Mann, Information Technology and Non-legal Sanctions in Financing Transactions, 54
VAND. L. REV. 1627, 1642-48 (2001). Intermediaries play an important role in the field of financial
transactions. For example, a securitized transaction implements a mechanism where a third party
intermediary "pools the transactions and sells small interests in the pool as a whole." Id. at 1644. The
intermediary represents the obligations contained in the pool that backs the securities. In order to verify
underlying obligations, the investors rely on assertions by the intermediary rather than examine the
underlying obligations by themselves.
51 Cf Katz, An Economic Analysis of the Guaranty Contract, supra note 44, at 47-90 (analyzing when
the parties to a financial transaction choose guarantees rather than intermediation).
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mediary's default is much lower than those of each other's default, and (ii)
the intermediary may monitor both the seller and the buyer so cost-
effectively (thus costs of their default risks also decrease as a result of a strong
monitoring) that both parties' switching their costs target to the intermediary
realizes total costs reduction effects, or even if the intermediary does not
monitor the counterpart effectively, the intermediation gives both the seller
and the buyer an incentive to perform a contract substantively so that costs
of their default risks become significantly lower.
Thus, the intermediary is often selected from among individuals or
entities who have robust reputation and financial credibility and who may
monitor both the seller and the buyer cost-effectively or induce substantive
performance of the seller and buyer. For instance, if the third party inter-
mediary is a "key player" in the relevant commodity market, the function of
the third party's intermediation is robust. From the seller's perspective, the
seller may reduce its monitoring costs and default risk costs by shifting its
costs target from the buyer to the intermediary if the reputation and the
financial credibility of the intermediary are stronger than those of the buyer.
Total costs of the seller and the intermediary will decrease if the intermediary
may monitor or collect from the buyer more cost-effectively. From the
buyer's perspective, on the other hand, the intermediation gives the seller a
strong incentive to perform substantively since the seller is afraid that poor
performance might destroy a business relationship with the key player in the
market. As long as one of the primary concerns for a buyer is whether he
will be able to take delivery successfully in accordance with the contract
terms, the buyer may feel that seeking indemnification against a reputed third
party at the expost enforcement stage is insufficient. An ex ante mechanism
that prevents the seller's rent-seeking behavior and poor performance must
also be established. Thus, like a guarantee scheme, an intermediation is
stronger if the seller regularly transacts with the third party intermediary and
the destruction of the relationship with it will seriously damage the seller's
future business.
A distributorship is a common example of this complete intermediation
model. When a manufacturer would like to export his products overseas, the
manufacturer often tries to appoint an overseas company as a sole distributor
of the products. In many cases, manufacturers favor using a distributorship
scheme when the overseas company has strong expertise in marketing in the
overseas country.52 However, such strong expertise is not the sole advantage
52 See Mitsui & Co Ltd. Website, Mitsui & Co. Ltd. Homepage, at http://www.mitsui.co.jp/tkabz/
english/index.html (last visited Oct. 15,2004). For example, Mitsui & Co. Ltd., one of the majorJapanese
trading companies, has introduced its business models related to distributor function on its homepage.
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of the distributorship scheme. A manufacturer takes advantage of the
distributor's high reputation and credit ratings in order to avoid the end
user's non-payment risk.53 Similarly, overseas end-users assume that the
distributorship by a highly reputed firm constitutes a strong signal that
induces the substantive performance of a foreign manufacturer. End-users
think that a foreign manufacturer is encouraged to perform a contract
substantively for fear of destroying a relationship with an important business
partner in the new overseas market. Further, they also think that the
distributor will have strong incentives to monitor a foreign manufacturer
more carefully because the poor performance of the foreign manufacturer
will also damage the distributor's own reputation. In sum, a particular third
party's intermediating a transaction scheme is one of the most cost-effective
means to create a bilateral incentive mechanism.
3. Two STAGES OF INFORMAL NORMS CREATED BY INCENTIVE
MECHANISMS
As discussed above, close examination of the traditional incentive
mechanisms implemented in real world transactions shows that intermedia-
tion and reputation are effective tools in electronic commerce. The reason
is simple. As electronic commerce is premised on online transactions
between two anonymous parties, two conditions are essential for the
development of electronic commerce: (i) soft is better than hard as a hostage
because hard assets inevitably require additional offline procedures and (ii)
bilateral is more desirable than unilateral assurance mechanisms because both
sellers and buyers need to verify each other due to the anonymous nature of
53 See, e.g., Chibli Mallat, Commercial Law in the Middle East: Between Classical Transactions and
Modem Business, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 81 (2000). When a product of a foreign manufacturer attains
popularity in a particular country via a domestic distributor's effort, a principal foreign manufacture may
try to exclude the distributor from the distribution channels. If the principal manufacturer obtains a good
reputation in the respective market, the manufacturer may no longer need the function of intermediation
as a reputational bond. Accordingly, many developing countries implement agency law, which regulates
the relationship between a principal and a distributor or agency. For example, typical statutes in the
Middle East provide for (i) an agent's right to receive commission on transactions that are concluded
without the effort's of the agent, (ii) restriction on a principal to terminate the agency agreement without
good cause, and (iii) an agent's right to compensation in the event of an inopportune termination of an
agency agreement without good cause. Id. at 106. The principal's refusal to renew an agent's contract
without proof of the agent's wrong justifying non-renewal shall constitute an abusive exercise of rights
entailing appropriate compensation. Id. The agent shall also be entitled to an appropriate compensation
if the agent's efforts as the commercial representative have led to success in the principal's business and
the principal's refusal to renew the agency contract has prevented the agent from reaping the profits of
his success. Id. at 107.
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electronic commerce. 4 Reputation and third party intermediation are the
mechanisms that fulfill these two conditions.
Incentives created by reputation and third party intermediation in turn
create informal norms. In this respect, incentive mechanisms classify the
transactional norms into the relationship-preserving norms and the end-game
norms. 5  Relationship-preserving norms are those in which contracting
parties attempt to revolve disputes cooperatively among themselves and want
to preserve their relationship. 6 End-game norms, on the other hand, are
usually incorporated in written contracts, where contracting parties no longer
intend to continue a contractual relationship and want a neutral third party
adjudicator to resolve disputes. 57  In paper-based transactions, end-game
norms are supposed to be legally enforceable contractual rights and
obligations under the end-game dispute resolution, whereas relationship-
preserving norms are usually self-enforcing (legally unenforceable) informal
norms under the cooperative stage.
58
54 For example, commercial letters of credit have bilateral incentive mechanisms. Issuance of a
letter of credit by an opening bank is not only a reputational bonding signal that the seller can rely on the
credibility of the buyer's payment commitment, but also a signal that the seller will not default on its
delivery obligation. Under transactions using letters of credit, the parties choose a formal condition
stricter than they plan to enforce in practice so that the costs of formal compliance-together with the
buyer's discretion to refuse payment when the formal conditions are not met-reinforce the seller's
incentives to perform substantively. See Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Letters of Credit in Payment Transactions,
98 MICH. L. REV. 2494 (2000); Katz, Bilateral Assurance, supra note 11.
55 See Bernstein, supra note 31, at 1796.
56 See id. at 1796. There are two types of relationship-preserving norms. Performance norms
"reflect the implicit extralegal terms transactors have agreed to abide by as long as they continue to trust
one another and/or value potential future dealings." Id. Dispute-resolution norms are "norms that
transactors follow in attempting to cooperatively resolve disputes in a manner that will not jeopardize
future dealings." Id.
57 See id. End-game norms also have two types. The first type is "an absolute end-game where
the parties, perhaps because of the action giving rise to the alleged breach, have decided not to deal with
one another again." Id. The second type is "an end-game round, a situation where the parties are in a
long-term contractual relationship that they wish to maintain, but where one or both of them have
committed to following a strategy that binds them to seek application of [end-game norms] under certain
circumstances." Id. at 1796-97.
58 See id. In this context, Bernstein argued in a series of her articles that sellers and buyers who
deal regularly in a particular market prefer a formalistic approach in contract interpretation and thus do
not necessarily want relationship-preserving norms (informal norms) to be used to resolve end-game
dispute. While courts routinely take relation-preserving norms (informal norms) into account in
resolving end-game dispute by applying the Uniform Commercial Code's usage of trade, course of
dealing, and course of performance provisions, contractual formalists criticize the Uniform Commercial
Code's contextual approach. They argue that applying relationship-preserving norms (informal norms)
in end-game situations will prevent transactors from developing their own arrangements for dealing with
the underlying transactions.
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However, the situation surrounding electronic commerce is unique. As
previously discussed, due to both high ex ante and high expost costs caused by
the Internet's long-distance, low-value, and stranger-to-stranger nature,
electronic commerce exists where formal legal enforcement is relatively
difficult. Contracting parties in electronic commerce often have little chance
to enforce contracts even though counter-parties breach the contract. In
order to solve these problems, contracting parties often exchange bonds or
hostages that encourage each other to perform contract obligations substan-
tively. However, even if contracting parties exchange bonds, the exchange
has little means of collecting from the other party when a party actually
encounters poor contractual performance at the ex post enforcement stage.
Thus, the most successful business models in electronic commerce are those
with a much stronger incentive. The incentive creates not only a "comple-
ment" to legal enforcement, as is usually seen in a cooperative stage of a
transaction mainly for purposes of settling a dispute voluntarily and amicably,
but also a "substitute" for legal enforcement, as is usually seen in a trans-
action's end-game stage, mainly to enable the claimant to recover losses
through judgment of a neutral adjudicator.
Incentive mechanisms are not an alternative between the above two, but
these two levels of incentives co-exist.5 9 Contracting parties who rely solely
on stronger end-game informal norms make their relationship unstable. In
general, end game dispute resolutions are often time consuming, even if they
informally take place online. For instance, the Buyer Protection Program
implemented byYahoo! Shopping that offers a buyer an opportunity to settle
disputes with a Yahoo! merchant requires the buyer to formally file a
complaint to Yahoo! Shopping within sixty days of purchase, and it takes a
maximum of forty-five days for the buyer to receive a final decision.60 Even
a typical end game mechanism like credit card chargeback systems, for
another example, requires a formal process to assert claims against a credit
card issuer, although the procedure is minimal. 61 Thus, a party who is keen
to secure substantive contract performance of its counterpart desires not only
a relatively weaker mechanism that mainly functions in a cooperative stage,
but also a stronger end game self-enforcing mechanism. In essence, typical
incentive types of business models created two stages of incentive mechan-
isms using reputation and intermediation, namely the relationship-preserving
stage and the end-game stage.
59 Indeed, the contracts that are observed in commercial transactions are neither perfectly
contingent nor entirely relational. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 12, at 1091.
60 See infra Part III.C.1.
61 See infra Part 1IIB.1.
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Further, the Internet's unique nature also raised another problem: since
requiring additional offline procedures in dispute resolution often ruins the
benefit of electronic commerce, a more desirable result is for the alternative
dispute resolution mechanism to be completed solely in the online process.
When business models try to incorporate an end-game dispute resolution
mechanism in their online procedure, the models must rely on the multiple
functions of the online intermediary. For instance, in a typical cyber
shopping mall such as Yahoo! Shopping, an operator of the shopping mall
may function as both a provider ofcyber space to tenant online shoppers, and
an adjudicator to settle disputes among buyers and the online shopper.62
Credit card issuers also function as both a provider of credit and an
adjudicator through their chargeback system.63 An online auction site is
another example of an auction site owner or its online payment service
provider functioning as both service provider and adjudicator.
64
Multiple functions of the online intermediary further make the nature
of the online dispute resolution process unique. If the dispute must be
resolved by the intermediary within its online procedure, the intermediary's
own interests must also be considered. To this effect, agreed contract terms
between contracting parties may not directly apply. For instance, credit card
issuers may have conflicts of interest with the dispute between an auction
seller and a buyer because card issuers have a claim against a buyer. Because
the card issuer has a conflict of interest with the claimant and the respondent,
the card issuer's judgment as an adjudicator is heavily influenced by how it
protects its rights and claims. The dispute resolution is an informal out-of-
court process where a third party adjudicator having conflicts of interest with
claimants and respondents settles the dispute by applying informal end-game
norms that are heavily influenced by the adjudicator's own interests rather
than formal contractual terms.
Consequently, business models in electronic commerce uniquely offer
two types of informal norms. For the first informal stage (informal relation-
ship-preserving stage), a reputational bond, often complemented by a risk-
absorbing function of a third party intermediary, creates an informal norm.
This norm mainly works at a cooperative phase. In this first stage, a seller
uses the buyer's reputation, obtained both online and offline, to verify
information asserted by the buyer. When a dispute arises, both sellers and
buyers try to reach a compromise for fear of the informal sanction of
reputational damage. For the second informal stage, or the informal end-
game stage, business models of electronic commerce create a mechanism of
62 See infra Part I1.C.1.
63 See infra Part III.B.1.
64 See infra Part III.C.3.
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dispute resolution by a third party intermediary. When a dispute arises,
contracting parties ask the third party intermediary to resolve the dispute.
The third party adjudicator, usually a financial intermediary, often applies his
own informal rules for dispute resolution rather than the contract terms.
4. NORMATIE IMPLICATIONS
The self-enforcement system within electronic commerce business
models, which primarily consists of a cooperative stage and an end-game
stage, works effectively through the process of contract formation and
performance, but does not finally bind contracting parties due to the system's
"informal" nature. A party who does not accept the decision made by a third
party intermediary will finally go to courts to receive legally enforceable
judgment on the issues (formal end-game stage). In this very last end-game
stage, courts apply the terms of contracts to resolve the dispute. Legal
enforcement is especially important when a dispute arises out of issues that
informal norms do not protect.
Understanding efficient allocation of informal and formal norms in
electronic commerce may justify the court's formalistic enforcement of the
standard terms of electronic commerce contracts. Two distinct reasons are
suggested by the discussion in Part II. First, judicial intervention in elec-
tronic commerce will destroy the subtle balance between formal and infor-
mal norms and thus make electronic commerce inefficient. As long as
website commerce operators develop a transactional scheme adopting a
business model with efficient bonding mechanisms and informal norms,
courts should be willing to consider the standard terms of electronic
contracts as one of the factors for the efficient allocation of formal and
informal norms. Second, it is assumed that reasonable consumers rationally
select the regime of online contracts rather than offline paper based contracts.
While paper-based face-to-face transactions may provide consumers with a
cash-on-delivery equivalent condition as well as an opportunity for direct
inspection of the quality and functionality of the product, the consumer
abandons such opportunity and minimizes administrative costs by
transacting through the Internet. Moreover, once consumers access a web-
site and perceive the structure of electronic commerce, they may easily grasp
the total mechanism of incentives in the business model. It is reasonable,
therefore, to assume that rational consumers, who acknowledge the overall
structure of incentives in the business model, often do not read standard
terms not because the transaction is made online, but because they feel they
are protected by informal norms. They will think that an online merchant's
business model provides sufficient consumer protection.
Accordingly, courts, in deciding whether they should intervene in the
standard terms within a disputed transaction, should be more sensitive to a
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business model that a merchant adopted for its online transactions. As long
as the underlying business models are efficiently allocating legal and non-
legal norms, the more formalistic interpretation of contract terms has great
appeal. This does not mean that courts should no longer be concerned about
consumers unwillingly entering into standard terms of agreements that are
fundamentally exploitative and unilaterally beneficial to the merchant.
Analyzing the business model that underlies an electronic commerce
transaction gives courts a standard by which they determine their level of
sensitivity to such consumer exploitation.
Electronic commerce is so standardized and automated that under-
standing the total mechanism of a business model is important. A transaction
in an electronic commerce business model is created in a conveyer-belt style
of machine-made, automated contract-formation process, where "electronic
agents" are actually engaged in negotiating with consumers.6" Electronic
commerce operators' intent is incorporated in the design of the business
model. In this sense, the level of sensitivity to consumer exploitation may be
dependent on the business model's structure. The sensitivity to consumer
protection differs according to how much the subject of the dispute is
protected or exploited by the business model's incentive mechanisms. If a
subject matter is covered by an efficient informal end-game dispute resolu-
tion mechanism within the merchant's business model, courts should
interpret these terms in accordance with their formal meaning. If the subject
is not covered by the business model's informal dispute resolution mechan-
ism, or if the business model's incentive mechanism that covers the subject
does not efficiently allocate legal and non-legal norms, it tends to be more
suspicious of exploitation.
For example, Specht v. Netscape Communications66 involved subject matter
outside the scope of an incentive mechanism. In Specht, the plaintiff argued
that using SmartDownload, Netscape's free of charge software, had
transmitted private information about the user's file transfer activity on the
Internet, thereby creating an electronic surveillance of the user's activity in
violation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act.67 The New York federal district court held that the
language labeled at the hyperlink "Please review and agree..." constituted a
mere invitation to the terms and conditions, thereby denying the enforce-
65 For a discussion of machine-made contract and electronic agents, see Margaret Jane Radin,
Human, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L. J. 1125, 1130 (1999), in which Radin notes that
"[i]n this category of machine-made contract, the idea is that two computers (rather than two humans,
or one human and one computer) 'negotiate' with each other and arrive at 'agreement' with each other."
66 Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
67 Id.
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ability of an arbitration clause in the boilerplate terms.6" However, the
essence of this case was that consumer privacy was not within the scope of
the protection by informal norms in the business model's incentives. From
the business model's perspective, the incentive mechanism in downloading
SmartDownload was exchanging a free download for the user's compliance
with the hyperlinked terms and conditions. Because consumer privacy may
not generally be considered the subject of bargaining in online transactions,
the court's suspicion of consumer exploitation was justified.
On the other hand, the case of ProCD v. Zeidenberg69 involved a trans-
action dispute within the range of a business model's incentive mechanism.
On the condition that he might return the disk for refund if he did not agree
to the terms displayed by the disk, defendant Zeidenberg purchased a disk
containing a database produced by ProCD. ProCD claimed that the
defendant violated a prohibition against reselling the data, which had been
provided in the displayed terms.70 Although the defendant argued that the
prohibition did not constitute an enforceable agreement because the terms
were displayed after he purchased the disk, the court held that the contract
had been formed as long as the defendant had an opportunity to read the
terms and agreed to them. l While this conclusion by itself may be upheld,
the more essential point is to what extent ProCD accepted a refund in its
regular transaction practice as a business model designed by it. As a restric-
tion of sublicense may be an essential part of the rights that a licenser should
protect, dispute concerning a sublicense restriction shall be covered by a
business model's informal dispute resolution mechanism. Precise under-
standing of the overall business model may be essential when courts look to
the transactional substance. In ProCD, the actual measure taken by ProCD
for implementing its refund policy was key to understanding the trans-
actional substance.
To summarize, because electronic commerce is more automated and
standardized than paper-based transactions, contract term interpretation must
be made by considering the overall business model and its embedded incen-
tive mechanisms that support informal self-enforcement. In general, pre-
vailing electronic commerce adopts efficient mechanisms of self-enforce-
ment. It allocates formal and informal regimes so well that relatively for-
malistic interpretation of contract terms (whether those terms are browse-
wrapped or clickwrapped in a website screen) are generally justified as an
interpretation principle. This does not mean that courts should not consider
68 Id.
69 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d. 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
70 Id.
71 Id.
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consumer exploitation, Internet fraud, or other failure of efficient allocation
of costs and benefits arising from the novelty of electronic commerce.
Although courts are likely to emphasize an aspect of contract formation
procedure, where accessibility to those online terms and adequate notice are
especially questioned, such requirements of accessibility and adequate notice
do not necessarily give equitable solutions to each dispute. While, as is seen
in Specht, courts often express skepticism against browsewrap contracts, the
reality is that many businesses using browsewrap employ even less satisfac-
tory notices than in Specht.72 This article therefore suggests that when such
issues concerning consumer protection are argued, courts must at least be
sensitive to overall efficiency underlying the merchant's business model in
interpreting contract terms.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
This article assumes that electronic commerce possesses two distinct
business models according to which costs, ex ante or ex post, are emphasized
as a cost-reduction target. Since contract drafting is costly and electronic
commerce cannot be a tool for reducing the drafting costs, most business
models are obliged to place a cost reduction target on establishing a system
of self-enforcement. Business models and private contracting are assumed
to be closely related because contracting parties' choice of complete or
incomplete contracts influence a formation of business models; the form of
the contract reflects the incentive mechanisms to be incorporated in the
business model. Based on these assumptions, Part III examines currently
prevailing business models of electronic commerce and explains how the
above mechanisms work in each model.
For this analysis, electronic commerce shall be classified into three
different types based on the number of players. Transactions are classified
according to the strength of the reputation as a bond. The first type is a one-
to-one transaction, where two particular parties are supposed to enter into
transactions from the outset. In many cases, the two particular parties have
alreadyverified each other's reputation by using offline information, and thus
they do not need an additional incentive online.
The second type of transaction, one-to-many, includes the situation
where one particular party (a site operator) that runs an electronic commerce
operation enters into transactions with multiple counter-parties. Usually, in
this case, one party's credibility (the site operator's reputation) has already
72 See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 429 (2002) (discussing whether courts should use a new method of evaluation to
guard against the risks imposed on consumers by Internet boilerplate language).
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been verified before the multiple counter-parties go online, but the site
operators have not verified each counter-party's credibility. This situation
is commonly seen in online shopping sites operated by highly reputed
business entities. When consumers go to a site, they already know through
offline information that the online shop owner's reputation is so esteemed
that they may enter into a transactional relationship with the shop owner
without a fear of transactional difficulties.
The third type, a many-to-many transaction, refers to situations where
two unknown parties from among multiple candidate-players are supposed
to enter into transactions. In many-to-many transactions, both parties have
yet to verify each other's reputation. Thus, they need a bilateral incentive
online more intensively in this type than in one-to-many transactions. This
type is found particularly in the e-marketplaces or auction sites where most
transactions are between strangers.
A. One-to-One Transactions3
1. TRADITIONAL EDI (VAN-EDI)-OFFLINE PAPER CONTRACTS
Traditional electronic data interchange ("EDI") is a typical illustration of
a one-to-one transaction. Technically, the term EDI refers to a general group
of electronic business languages, such as ANSI X12 or UNiEDIFACT.74
73 This classification is compatible with new terminology invented in a marketing study, the
"one-to-one marketing" strategy. The one-to-one marketing is a strategy that places its marketing target
on an individual customer rather than mass consumers. This classification requires extensive, repeated,
and recorded communications with customers as well as a company's ability to store, analyze, and process
the customer data. The Internet business is often compatible with one-to-one marketing because the
strategy enables businesses to store individual information effectively at lower costs. One-to-one
marketing strategies were designed to contrast with traditional mass marketing where manufacturers first
produce standard products and then look for anonymous customers. While mass marketing strategies
have their target on multiple consumers, one-to-one marketing strategies focus on an individual customer
and develop a tailored product that is suitable for the individual customer. There are four important steps
to ensure that one-to-one marketing will work effectively: (i) identifying customers, (ii) differentiating
among them, (iii) interacting with them, and finally, (iv) customizing products or services to fit each
individual customer's needs. In this respect, the information verification is required especially in the first
step of the above four. A verification process occurs when a business finds one counter-part (one-to-one
stage) from among multiple candidates (one-to-many or many-to-many stage). In this respect, successful
business models can efficiently transform players in one-to-many or many-to-many transactions into
those in the one-to-one equivalent contract relationship. This transformation process is a starting point
for marketing development. The terminology of the one-to-one marketing strategy is an invention of Don
Peppers and Martha Rogers. See Don Peppers, Martha Rogers, and Bob Dorf, Is Your Company Ready for
One-to-One Marketing?, HARV. Bus. REv. Jan. - Feb. 1999, at 151 [hereinafter Peppers & Dorf]. See also
Peppers & Rogers Group Website, at http://www.ltol.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
74 See ASC X12 Website, ASC X12 Homepage, at http://www.xl2.org/xl2org/index.cfm (last
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Traditionally, EDI involved an online data transfer between two com-
munication end points connected by a Value Added Network (VAN). In a
typical sales transaction, a seller and a buyer deploy a server that acts as an
end point gateway for EDI communications. However, there have been
traditional barriers to implement a VAN due to high costs. VAN-EDI needs
a data transformation system and proprietary software in each client so that
the client may be able to use the data in the base system. Further, substantial
labor and costs are required for maintenance and frequent system upgrade.
Therefore, generally only major companies that meet large cost and trading
volume requirements have used traditional VAN-EDI. EDI is a substitute
for conventional paper documents in business. The computer communi-
cates any data electronically in standardized formats, such as purchase orders,
invoices, shipping notices, and remittance advices7 5 Before Internet trans-
actions exploded in the late 1990's, typical electronic commerce was an EDI
of closed networks, used only among the limited relational parties.7 6 The
EDI process is supported by the mutual dependence on long-term trans-
actions. Contracting parties' investments in the EDI itself are relational-
specific investments, which enhance each other's compliance with a long-
term contract.7 7
At the same time, a discussion on how to assure the validity and
predictability of commercial transactions in the use of EDI continued. In
1989, a Task Force created by the subcommittee of the American Bar
Association's Committee on the Uniform Commercial Code implemented
the Model Electronic Data Interchange Trading Partner Agreement and
visited Oct. 15, 2004). ANSI X12 (ANSI Accredited Standards Committee X12) is produced by the
Accredited Standard Committee X12 (ASC X12). In 1979, the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI) chartered the Accredited Standards Committee (ASC) X12 to develop uniform standards for EDI.
SeeASC X12 Website, The Creation ofASCX12, at http://www.x12.org/xl2org/about/X12History.cfm (last
visited Feb.15, 2005). UN/EDIFACT (United Nations' rules for Electronic Data Interchange for
Administration, Commerce, and Transport) is a set of standards, directories, and guidelines for the
electronic interchange of structured data, which is recommended within the framework of the United
Nations. UN/EDIFACT is approved and published by the UN/ECE (United Nations Economic
Commission of Europe) in the United Nations Trade Data Interchange Directory (UNTDID) and is
maintained under agreed procedures. See UNECE UN/EDIFACT Website, UNECE UN/EDIFACT
Main Page, at http://www.unece.org/trade/untdid/welcome.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
75 Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, The Commercial Use of Electronic Data Interchange -
A Report, 45 Bus. LAW. 1645, 1649 (1990) [hereinafter The Commercial Use of Electronic Data Interchange];
Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, Model Electronic Date Interchange Trading Partner Agreement and
Commentary, 45 BUS. LAW. 1717, 1718 (1990).
76 Jean Braucher, Rent-Seeking and Risk-Fixing in the New Statutory Law of Electronic Commerce:
Difficulties in Moving Consumer Protection Online, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 527, 534 (2001).
77 See Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics, supra note 11 (regarding the relation-specific
investment).
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Commentary ("Model EDI Agreement") 78 The Task Force's primary intent
was to "be self-sufficient as a tool for attorneys asked to prepare definitive
agreements governing the use of EDI in commercial transactions." 79 The
Task Force observed that EDI is implemented most frequently by transactors
with a long-standing purchase and sale relationship.80  The Model EDI
Agreement does not presuppose stranger-to-stranger contracts among
multiple parties. The business models targeted by the Model Agreement are
typical two party relation-specific investments against the EDI facilities.
Their primary purpose is to minimize various administration costs and
enhance self-enforcement by having EDI assets as relation-specific hostages.
Because EDI transactions presuppose that two relational parties engage in
similar transactions regularly with intent to preserve their relationship,
contracting parties may write a paper contract offline at cheaper costs prior
to proceeding with individual transactions online.
2. INTERNET-EDI-FROM PAPER TO ONLINE CONTRACTS
The advent of Internet technology enables EDI to be developed in an
open network. TCP/IP network makes technical connections between in-
house and EDI systems easier. Any company can participate in EDI simply
by using aWeb-browser or mail software, and thus communication and tech-
nical costs are substantially lower than traditional VAN-EDI. The advent of
Internet-EDI enables online contract drafting costs to be much lower.
While Internet-EDI has an advantage in utilizing the Internet open
network, the transformation ofEDI data into each in-house system's unique
data format poses a technical difficulty."' As a tool to solve this connection
78 The Commercial Use of Electronic Data Interchange, supra note 75, at 1651-53.
79 Id. at 1653.
s Id. The Task Force set an example of the process of EDI as follows:
ABC and XYZ have a long-standing purchase and sale relationship. Recognizing the economic
and administrative benefits attributed to EDI, ABC announces to its vendors, including XYZ,
that ABC will require, or provide incentives for, the use of EDI in future transactions. ABC
engages a third party service provider (referred to in the Model Agreement as a "Provider") to
receive, transmit, and sort the various EDI transmissions of ABC. In addition, ABC deter-
mines which paper-based documents will be replaced by EDI formats, as well as which
industry standards will be adopted around which all transmissions will be structured, and
implements certain security procedures for assuring the authenticity and integrity of the
electronic communications. All of this information is communicated to ABC's vendors, one
of which is XYZ, who must implement EDI accordingly to keep ABC's business (or obtain the
available incentives, as the case may be).
Id. at 1655-56.
81 See, e.g., Electronic Commerce Promotion Council of Japan, Internet EDI (XML/EDI)
Introduction Guide Book (2003), http://www.ecom.jp/ecome/press/20030529/InternetEDIGuidebook.pdf
(last visited Dec. 21, 2004).
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problem, XML-EDI recently has attracted great attention. Extensible
Markup Language (XML) is a universal markup language being developed
by a working group of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). 2 XML
provides a file format for representing data, a schema for describing data
structure, and a mechanism for extending and annotating various types of
data with semantic information.83 XML allows developers to easily describe
and deliver rich and structured data in a standard and consistent way.
Developers can also transform XML into many other types of data, such as
HTML, CSV, and CDF, so that they can view the data in a browser. Unlike
HTML that displays text and images now found on Web pages, XML enables
the exchange of structured data over the Web. 84 Developing cross-industry
XML specifications requires a uniform standardization such as (i) exchanging
transactional data, (ii) developing messaging and protocol infrastructure, (iii)
creating code-value dictionaries, (iv) devising trading partner agreements,
and (v) defining business processes performed in conjunction with business-
to-business exchanges.85  XML-EDI may shift contract practice in EDI
transactions from the traditional paper regime to the online one, as if the
online process were a paper exchange by hand delivery, fax, or telex.
However, XML-EDI still has a long way to go before it becomes universal.
Research in Japan shows that only 2.5% ofJapanese firms have implemented
XML-EDI, and 4.6% of firms are currently preparing to use it.
86
82 See World Wide Web Consortium Website, World Wide Web Consortium Homepage, at
http://www.w3.org (last visited Dec. 21, 2004).
83 For the general explanation ofXML, see, for example, W3 Schools Website, XML Tutorial, at
http://www.w3schools.com/xmVdefault.asp (last visited October 18,2004); ASC X12 Website, Frequently
Asked Questions (FAQs), at http://www.x12.org/x12org/about/faqs.cfm#b1 (last visited Oct. 15, 2004);
Electronic Commerce Promotion Council of Japan (ECOM) Homepage, Topics, at
http://www.ecom.jp/ecom_e/index.html, (last visited Oct. 15, 2004); Xenos Website, Homepage, at
http://www.xmlglobal.com/homepage.asp (last visited Oct. 15, 2004). See also Jane Kaufman Winn,
MakingXML Pay: Revising Existing Electronic Payments Law to Accommodate Innovation, 53 SMU L. REv. 1477,
1494 (2000) (noting that XML might play a larger role in creating mechanisms of consumer electronic
payments if regulators successfully intervene in standard-setting processes to incentivize industry's acting
upon consumer preferences).
84 See W3 School's Website, XML Tutorial, Introduction to XML, at
http://www.w3schools.conVxmVxml_whatis.asp (last visited Oct. 18, 2004) (emphasizing that XML
intended to describe data and focus on the data's content, whereas HTML intended to display data and
focus on the data's looks).
85 ASC X12 Website, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), at
http://www.x12.org/xl2org/about/faqs.cfm#a2 (last visited Dec. 21, 2004).
86 Japan Electronic Data Interchange Council, Kokunai Kgyo Ni Okeru EDIJittai Chosa [Research
on EDI inJapanese Domestic Company], (2000), at http://www.ecom.jp/jedic/activity/jittai2002.pdf (last
visited Oct. 17,2004).
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3. SUMMARY
The common example of a one-to-one transaction is an EDI platform
that provides players with places to negotiate and contract. EDI originally
started from a closed network between two parties who knew each other well
(VAN-EDI), but the advent of the Internet made EDI open to multiple
players (Internet-EDI). Traditional one-to-one transactions do not require
any incentive online to strengthen substantive performance. Contracting
parties have often verified information asserted by counter-parties by using
an offline information source prior to beginning the negotiations. In
addition, EDI investments, which constitute relation-specific investments,
function as a hostage. These investments give transactors a strong incentive
to perform contracts substantively and to continue transactions, at least until
they recover their investment costs.
Traditional EDI does not presuppose online contracting in its EDI
arrangement. As ex ante contract specification costs in traditional EDI are
already lower offline due to their long-term relationship,8 7 contracting parties
often write their contracts on an offline, paper basis. However, recent
technological development made EDI possible in multilateral situations.
Since Internet-EDI substantially reduces EDI related investment costs so that
more transactors may enter into EDI systems more easily, the bar which
transactors need to pass in order to join EDI has become lower. Further,
XML-EDI enables contracting parties to conclude their contracts online.
EDI systems are becoming much closer to being a mere substitute for the
traditional information paper exchange by fax or telex, easing the online
execution of contracts.
B. One-to-Many Transactions
1. ONLINE SHOPPING SITES-BILATERAL INCENTIVES THROUGH
PAYMENT MECHANISMS
An online shop operated by a reputed business entity is a typical example
of one-to-many electronic commerce transactions that use a credit card
payment system. Unlike an auction site, players consist of one specific seller
(an online shop owner) and multiple buyers. The transactional mechanism
is simple: a consumer goes into an online shop to find goods that he or she
is looking for. When the consumer finds the goods, he or she drags the
87 Indeed, Model EDI Agreement presupposes two parties with a long-standing purchase and sale
relationship. Contract terms are negotiated and created based on past transactional experiences. See The
Commercial Use of Electronic Data Interchange, supra note 75, at 1655-56.
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picture of the goods into a virtual basket. After the consumer selects the
goods he or she wants, he or she settles payment with a credit card. The
goods are delivered several days after the purchase. In these transactions,
online shop owners usually minimize their risks by using credit card
companies' authorization processes. For online shop owners, verifying a
buyer's credibility is extremely important due to its anonymity. Accordingly,
one of the most important conditions for successful online shops is to select
reliable financial institutions that intermediate transactions and provide
buyers with credit. By selecting a financial intermediary, an online shop
owner may switch the target of their risk analysis from buyers to the financial
institution.
On the other hand, consumers have to rely on offline soft information
outside electronic commerce as long as they do not have other sufficient
tools to evaluate online shop owners. Consumers are concerned about who
is operating the online shop. In fact, consumers carefully choose highly
reputed business entities when they proceed with electronic commerce.
Before purchasing, most consumers have already verified the reliability of the
online shop owner. Indeed, famous manufacturers or giant companies are
often most successful in implementing electronic commerce businesses, such
as the airline e-ticket used by airplane companies or computer sales by large
manufacturers. These companies have already received outstanding reputa-
tions through their activities in real world transactions. Empirical facts show
that successful online shopping operators such as Priceline.com and
Amazon.com have spent a considerable amount of money in advertising fees
to establish good brand images.88
However, even though highly reputed businesses operate online shop-
ping sites, their reputations do not necessarily satisfy the verification require-
ment of contracting parties. Complete incentives in electronic commerce are
those by which businesses can not only verify consumers, but also employ
robust self-enforcement devices within business models as a substitute for
formal enforcement. In online shopping sites, payment mechanisms offer
these incentives. Indeed, businesses have introduced various payment
systems into online shopping sites since the advent of Internet commerce.
Credit Card Payment: Credit card payment is the dominant payment
mechanism in electronic commerce. 89 The credit card system offers two
88 For example, eToys's advertisement expense in the last quarter of 2000 was 29.5% of its total
sales in the same period, which exceeded its gross margin of 24.3%. Fujitsu Research Institute Website,
at http://www.fri.fujitsu.com/hypertext/fri/cyber/colum/click/new0l.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2004).
89 Jane Kaufman Winn, Clash of the Titans: Regulating the Competition Between Established and
Emerging Payment Systems, 14 BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 675,687 (1999) [hereinafter Winn, Clash of the Titans];
David E. Sorkin, Payment Methods for Consumer-to-Consumer Online Transactions, 35 AKRON L. REV. 1, 7
(2001) [hereinafter Sorkin].
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stages of incentives to online shipping sites. First, credit card issuers function
as a financial intermediary for a transaction between the merchant and the
consumer. The credit card system strikes a subtle balance of both their
incentives with the intermediation of a card issuer.90 Intermediation by a
card issuer functions as an undertaker of the buyer's non-payment risk, and
at the same time works as a reputational intermediary, assuring the seller's
fair dealing (informal relationship-preserving stage). A credit card system,
through its chargeback mechanism, assures that the seller will not act
opportunistically by taking advantage of the standard terms of contracts that
do not necessarily reflect the substance of the transactions. Second, the
mechanism of credit card payments does not offer "finality" at the time of
credit card authorizations, but instead offers an informal dispute resolution
mechanism.9' More concretely, credit card payments give a consumer the
opportunity to receive a refund of his payment through the credit card's
chargeback mechanism supported by regulations (informal end-game stage).
Regulation Z, which regulates credit card transactions, provides card-
holders with (i) the right to withhold "any portion of any required payment
that cardholders believe is related to the disputed amount,, 92 and (ii) the right
to assert against card issuers "all claims (other than tort claims) and defenses
arising out of the transaction and relating to the failure to resolve the dispute"
with merchants.93 The right of cardholders to assert claims and defenses
applies only if cardholders have made "a good faith attempt to resolve dis-
putes with the person honoring the credit card., 94 In addition, cardholders
may assert claims only if the amount of credit exceeds $50, and the disputed
transaction occurred in the cardholder's home state or, if not within the
home state, within 100 miles from the cardholder's address.95 Despite the
above limitations, a card issuer often voluntarily accepts a chargeback even
if the transaction does not qualify under the requirements of Regulation Z.
9 6
Regulation Z also provides a consumer with protection against the
unauthorized use of his or her credit cards. "A cardholder shall be liable for
unauthorized use of a credit card only if: (i) [t]he credit card is an accepted
credit card;, 97 (ii) "[t]he card issuer has provided adequate notice of the
90 See Sorkin, supra note 89 at 8; Perritt, supra note 18 at 691-92.
91 See Perritt, supra note 18 at 691-92.
92 Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 12 C.F.R. 5 226.13(d)(1).
93 Id. at § 226.12(c)(1).
94 Id. at § 226.12(c)(3)(i).
95 Id. at § 226.12(c)(3)(ii).
6 Sorkin, supra note 89, at 8-9.
97 12 C.F.R. S 226.12(b)(2)(i) (2004) (An "accepted credit card means any credit card that a
cardholder has requested or applied for and received, or has signed, used, or authorized another person
to use to obtain credit.") (emphasis added).
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cardholder's maximum potential liability and of means by which the card
issuer may be notified of loss or theft of the card;" 98 and (iii) "[t]he card
issuer has provided a means to identify the cardholder on the account or the
authorized user of the card."99 However, mail order or telephone order
(MOTO) transactions-which include Internet credit card transactions-are
card-not-present transactions, and do not satisfy the third requirement listed
above. If card issuers cannot provide a means to identify cardholders in
electronic commerce, "card issuers may not contest a cardholder's claim that
a charge was not authorized, and under certain risk allocation rules, card
issuers charge the transaction back to merchants."' For merchants to avoid
chargeback, they must prove that they indeed provided goods or services to
the cardholder.
Electronic Fund Transfer / Debit Card Transactions: The electronic fund
transfer is a payment mechanism in which payment is made through the
Automated Clearing House (ACH). Debit cards are those which debit
payment automatically from a buyer's account at the time of purchase and
credit a seller's account a few days after the purchase.'' Unlike credit cards,
debit cards automate fund removal from bank accounts and do not require
cardholders to pay bills. Although the use of debit cards is growing rapidly
in the United States in real world transactions, debit cards have not attained
popularity in online transactions. 2
98 Id. at § 226.12(b)(2)(ii) (stating that "the notice shall state that the cardholder's liability shall
not exceed $50.").
9 Id. at § 226.12(b)(2)(iii). The Credit Billing Act provides for a creditor's obligation to
investigate an obligor's claims of billing errors. After receiving a notice ofbilling errors from an obligor,
a creditor shall either make appropriate corrections in the account of the obligor, or send a written
explanation or clarification to the obligor, after having conducted an investigation describing the reasons
why the creditor believes the billing is correct. Under the Credit Billing Act, the billing errors include "A
reflection on a statement of goods or services not accepted by the obligor or his designee or not delivered
to the obligor or his designee in accordance with the agreement made at the time of a transaction." 15
U.S.C. § 1666(b)(3) (2003). See also, Perrit, supra note 18, at 689.
100 Winn, Clash of the Titans, supra note 89, at 687. In this connection, Japanese law does not have
such a rule that card issuers bear the risk of unauthorized transactions. However, in practice, Japanese
card issuers retain the risk of unauthorized transactions, covering such risk by insurance or, when
insurance does not cover, bearing the risk by itself See Ronald J. Mann, Credit Card and Debit Card in the
United States and Japan, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1089-90 (2002) [hereinafter Mann, Credit Card and Debit
Card in the United States and Japan].
101 See Mann, Credit Card and Debit Card in the United States and Japan, supra note 100, at n.2.
102 A survey reports that in 2000 there were 8.3 billion dollars of debit card purchase transactions
in the United States, a 30% increase from the previous year. Id. at 1056 n.3. On the other hand, debit
cards are not popular in Japan. In December 2000, consumers used the Japanese debit card system, or
the J-Debit card, for slightly over 500,000 transactions. This accounted for less than 1% of all card-based
transactions. Id. at 1100.
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Both electronic fund transfers and debit card transactions are regulated
by Regulation E, which implements the Electronic Transfer Act.'03 Com-
pared with Regulation Z, however, Regulation E provides narrower
protection to cardholders. First, while Regulation Z gives cardholders the
right to withhold payment on the amount in dispute,'t 4 Regulation E does
not have any dispute resolution mechanism for post-payment disputes. This
means that neither electronic fund transfers nor the debit card system gives
buyers any assurances that the seller will respond in good faith to the buyer's
claim to the related sales transactions. Secondly, although Regulation E
limits liability of a debit cardholder for unauthorized transactions up to $500,
timely notice is strictly enforced in order for the cardholder to enjoy the
limitation of liability. 0 5 Because of public pressure, some debit card issuers
have waived the benefit of a low level of consumer protection by allowing
consumers to limit liability for unauthorized transactions to the same $50
that applies to credit cards without a timely notice requirement.
10 6
Nevertheless, such treatment does not necessarily give buyers perfect
assurance. The "finality" of payment, a fundamental nature of debit card and
electronic transfers, deprives consumers of the opportunity for an informal
end-game dispute dissolution when the dispute arises out of imperfect
performance by a merchant.
Electronic Money: Electronic money or digital cash is a new payment
system that stores and transfers value ("e-cash") online. 07 An individual who
desires to use e-cash to make a purchase via the Internet could download e-
cash (taken from his bank account) to his wallet, which is on his personal
103 The Electronic Fund Transfer Act provides a basic framework regarding "the rights, liabilities,
and responsibilities of participants in electronic fund transfer systems." 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (2004). The
Federal Reserve Board has an authority to implement regulations that regulate the fund transfer system,
such as the automated teller machine (ATM), the point-of-sale terminal (POS), the automated
clearinghouse (ACH), the telephone bill-payment system, or the home banking program. See Electronic
Fund Transfer (Regulation E), 12 C.F.R. § 205.16.
104 Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(c)(1).
105 Electronic Fund Transfer (Regulation E), states, in part, that:
If the consumer fails to notify the financial institution within two business days after learning
of the loss or theft of the access device, the consumer's liability shall not exceed the lesser of
$ 500 or the sum of:
(i) $ 50 or the amount of unauthorized transfers that occur within the two business days,
whichever is less; and
(ii) The amount of unauthorized transfers that occur after the close of two business days and
before notice to the institution, provided the institution establishes that these transfers would
not have occurred had the consumer notified the institution within that two-day period.
Id. at § 205.6.
106 Winn, Clash of the Titans, supra note 89, at 689.
io7 See id. at 691-93 (describing electronic money).
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computer hard drive. 10 8 The software used with this program then deducts
e-cash from the wallet when an individual purchases an item from a
merchant.'09 After the merchant requests to transfer the e-cash back to a
bank, the bank will "cancel the [e-cash] and credit the merchant's account
with the bank."'10 Electronic money offers finality of settlement in that the
payment may no longer be revoked once e-cash is transferred.
Despite many attempts in the late 1990's, most of the digital cash services
did not attract consumers."' Presumably, these digital cash systems did not
achieve popularity because their business models offered few incentives.
First, the incentive mechanism functioned unilaterally to the benefit of
sellers. The digital cash system offered no specific incentive for sellers to
verify a buyer's credibility. Secondly, the intermediation of the digital cash
issuer offered a substantial risk reduction only if the digital cash issuer was
well-reputed. However, due to the system's brief history, the offline
reputation of the digital cash issuer was often not high enough to function
as a bond, as opposed to the credit card companies whose long histories
provided sound reputational bonds.
Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) / Secure Sockets Layer (SSL): The SET
is an open technical standard for the commerce industry developed by Visa
and MasterCard as a way to facilitate secure payment card transactions over
the Internet. The SET protocol consists of four components: the Cardholder
Application, or the Wallet, which is run by an online consumer and enables
secure credit card payment over a network; the Merchant Server, which is
run by an on-line merchant to process credit card payment and authoriza-
tions; the Payment Gateway, which is run by an acquirer or a designated
third party that processes payment-related information and interfaces with
private financial networks; and finally the Certificate Authority component,
which is operated by a financial institution or an approved third party who
is authorized to issue and verify digital certificates.1 2 SET uses cryptography
to "provide confidentiality of information", "ensure payment integrity",
"authenticate both merchants and cardholders", and "make payment
processingon the [Inter] Net faster, safer, and more secure." 113 Cryptography
1os Id. at 692.
109 Id.
110 Id.
III See Sorkin, supra note 89, at 9. The pioneer of digital cash, DigiCash, attempted to exploit the
market of online electronic money, but declared Chapter Eleven in 1998 and discontinued service in the
United States. Other electronic payment technologies, such as MilliCent and CyberCoin, have had little
success thus far in obtaining demand for their products. Winn, Clash of the Titans, supra note 89, at 692-93.
112 See, e.g., William Stallings, Introduction To Secure Electronic Transaaion (SET), available at
http://www.informit.com/articles/article.asp?p =26857 (2002).
113 IBM Website, Cryptography and SET Part I, at http://www-3.ibm.com/software/genservers/
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mainly benefits the merchants, since the SET protocol provides the
merchants with the mechanism to verify that buyers are those who they
claim to be. However, even though SET is "a very sophisticated system for
improving the security of electronic funds transfers over open networks,"
SET did not attain popularity from the outset and "by early 1999 was no
longer in the forefront of discussions about Internet commerce security. u4
On the other hand, the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), invented by
Netscape, is a simpler protocol for securing Internet transactions." 5 The
protocol uses a digital certificate to identify merchants' servers, but does not
use a digital signature." 6 The certificate only verifies consumers' browsers,
not the consumers themselves.' 7 The consumers' browsers "validate the
server's certificate, and then uses the public key in the certificate to share a
symmetric key with the server ... [T]he shared symmetric key is used to
encrypt communications between the browser and the server, preventing
credit card or other sensitive information from being sent over the
Internet."" 8 However, even though SSL is widely used for securitypurposes,
SSL is not completely a bilateral incentive, because the protocol does not give
contracting parties an incentive for fair contract performance.
If SET is more secure than SSL, why has SSL achieved widespread
acceptance in the field of electronic commerce? Comparing the function of
both protocols, SET additionally offers the assurance that a particular
consumer is exactly the person who is attempting to deal with the merchant.
Nevertheless, there is no significant difference on the side of consumers.
SET does not offer any effective incentive structure for consumers despite
SET's lengthy and complicated mechanism. Consumers actually desire to
have some additional assurance mechanisms to verify site owners whose
reputation does not perfectly work as a bond.
2. ELECTRONIC TENDER PROCUREMENT SYSTEMS - GOVERNMENT
REPUTATION
Electronic tender procurement systems presuppose the existence of one
particular purchaser and multiple sellers or seller-candidates. Under this
system, seller-candidates post bids in a procurement auction, and those
commerce/payment/partl.html (last visited Oct. 24,2004).
114 Winn, Clash of the Titans, supra note 89, at 690.
115 See Netscape Website, Secure Sockets Layer, at http://wp.netscape.com/security/techbriefs/ssl.html
(last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
116 Winn, Clash of the Titans, supra note 89, at 696.
117 Id.
118 Id.
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sellers that posted the lowest price are entitled to start contract negotiations
with the purchaser. The most suitable purchasers under electronic tender
systems are government agencies. Many government agencies have
attempted to introduce new electronic tender systems for government
procurements. In Australia, the Commonwealth Government has imple-
mented the Australian Government Tender System (AusTender), which
enables bidders to access the selected Commonwealth Government bidding
opportunities electronically. "9 In Hong Kong, the Government Supplies
Department (GSD) uses the Electronic Tendering System for the procure-
ments of all government departments and some non-government bodies.12
In Singapore, the Singapore Government Electronic Business Partner
(GeBIZ Partner) is a central website for the public to participate in govern-
ment procurement activities. 121 In Japan, the Ministry of Public Manage-
ment, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications, has started to operate
the Electronic Tender and Examine System for making government procure-
ment processes electronically.' 22 It appears that electronic tender systems
generally aim to reduce administrative costs. Unlike online shopping site
owners, government offices operating electronic tender systems probably
have stronger reputations so that bidders will be able to enter into electronic
tender processes without requesting any additional incentive mechanism.
The United States is no exception. Both federal and state agencies have
made many attempts to create electronic procurement systems. For federal
agencies, the U.S. General Service Administration established GSA Advant-
age!, the online shopping and ordering system that provides access to
thousands of contractors and millions of services and products)" One
component of GSA Advantage! is e-Buy. e-Buy is an electronic system
designed to allow government agencies (Federal Buyers) to obtain a quota-
tion or proposal directly on-line for a wide-range of services and products
119 See AusTender Website, Homepage, at http://www.tenders.gov.au (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
AusTender is the initiative of the Commonwealth Electronic Procurement Implementation Strategy by
the National Office for the Information Economy. AusTender refers to any business opportunity
advertised by Australian Government agencies. States and territories of Australia have their own
electronic tender systems. See, e.g., http://www.cpsc.nsw.gov.au/e-procurement (last visited Feb. 28, 2005)
(New South Wales); http://notes.nt.gov.au/Tender.nsf (last visited Feb. 28, 2005) (Northern Territory);
http://www.gem.wa.gov.au/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2005) (West Australia).
120 See Electronic Tender System Website, Homepage, at https://www.ets.com.hk/English/
Generallnfo/info.asp (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
121 See GeBiz Partner Website, Homepage, at http://www.gebiz.gov.sg (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
122 See Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications, Electronic
Tender and Examine System, at http://www.e-procurement.soumu.go.jp (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
123 See generally U.S. General Service Administration Website, Homepage, at
http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/home.do?tabld = 0 (last visited Oct. 24, 2004); GSA Advantage! Website,
Homepage, at https://www.gsaadvantage.gov/advgsa/mainpages/startpage.jsp (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
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from contractors (Schedule Contractors). 124  e-Buy allows Request For
Quotes ("RFQ"s) to be exchanged electronically between federal agencies
and Schedule Contractors. 125 For Federal Buyers, "e-Buy maximizes their
buying power by leveraging the power of the Internet to increase Schedule
contractor participation to obtain quotations that result in best value purchase
decisions." 126 For Schedule Contractors, "e-Buy provides greater opportuni-
ties to offer quotations and increase business volume for supplies and
services provided under their Schedule contracts."
127
Using the e-Buy system, Federal Buyers "may prepare and post a RFQ
for specific services and products for a designated period of time." 12 Each
RFQ is given its own Special Item Number ("SIN"), and Schedule Con-
tractors are "automatically listed under their awarded SIN categories."
129
After Federal Buyers notify all or a part of the Schedule Contractors listed
under a particular SIN category, listed Schedule Contractors quote at the e-
Buy Web site. 130 Once a particular RFQ has closed, Federal Buyers then
"evaluate and accept the quotation that represents the best value.' 131 After the
Federal Buyers accept a quotation, it may issue an order to the Schedule
Contractors. 
132
At the state level, eMaryland M@rketplace is one of the prominent state
government procurement portals. It provides the State of Maryland with a
tool to expand the pool of Maryland businesses providing goods and services
to the state. It achieves efficient procurement activities via the Internet,
including posting procurement opportunities, receiving bids, and making
purchases.'33 Government agencies can establish real-time communications
and business transactions with vendors in a paperless environment, minimiz-
ing administrative costs. The system increases buying power through inter-
governmental cooperative procurement and heightens competition across a
124 See GSA Advantage! eBuyWebsiteHomepageat https://www.ebuy.gsa.gov/advgsa/ebuybuyer/
ebuy login.jsp (last visited Sept. 10, 2004).
12 See U.S. General Service Administration Website, e-Tools: e-Buy, at http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/
gsa/ep/contentView.do?contentld = 1 1870&contentType = GSAOVERVIEW (last visited Oct. 24,2004).
12 Id.
127 Id.
128 U.S. General Service Administration Website, e-Tools: How Does e-Buy Work?, at
http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/contentView.do?programld = 8456&channelld= -
13828&ooid = 1 1870&contentld = 1233 1&pageTypeld = 8199&contentType = GSABASIC&programP





133 See eMaryland M@rketplace Website, Homepage, at http://www.emarylandmarketplace.com
(last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
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wider spectrum of suppliers. 134 Sellers achieve more timely communications
by accessing one portal to conduct business with participating buyers rather
than having to visit thousands of procurement officers throughout the
state. 135 The robust reputation of government agencies enables them to
establish online commerce systems that focus on minimizing administrative
costs.
3. SUMMARY
In the one-to-many transaction stage, reasonable consumers often care-
fully select a reputed online shop by relying on its reputation signal as a
bond. Reputation functions well as an initial verification of reliability of a
counterpart at the time of the contract formation. Once a dispute occurs, the
threat of reputation loss induces a cooperative solution to the dispute. How-
ever, an offline reputation is often imperfect, because it does not offer a
system of self-enforcement for the end game stage. Electronic commerce
requires much stronger incentives than reputation, and thus reputed site
operators still need to offer additional incentives. In this context, credit card
transactions unsurprisingly have a dominant position in electronic com-
merce, as these transactions provide efficient bilateral incentives that subtly
maintain a balance between sellers' and buyers' verification demands. The
credit card system not only offers a risk verification mechanism (informal
relationship-preserving norms), but also offers contracting parties an
opportunity to utilize extralegal dispute resolutions by a third party tribunal
through the credit card's charge back system (informal end-game norms).
On the other hand, electronic money or digital cash is no longer in the
mainstream of payment systems, presumably because the system completely
or partially lacks a balance of protection for sellers and buyers and does not
offer dispute resolution mechanisms.
By contrast, electronic tender systems (one government entity and many
bidders) do not necessarily require online incentives other than those for
minimizing administration costs. Electronic tender systems seem to be
generally categorized as business models that mainly focus on the rationaliza-
tion of government agencies' administrative processes. Thus, it appears that
incentive mechanisms play a lesser role in electronic tender systems.
134 See id.
135 See id.
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C. Many-to-Many Transactions
1. ONLINE SHOPPING MALLS - MALL'S REPUTATION AS A BOND
An online shopping mall is a Web market place that has many tenant
online shops. Like online shopping site owners, each tenant online shop
utilizes the credit card system for the shop's risk verification purpose.
However, consumers often have difficulty in verifying tenants, because each
tenant in an online marketplace is often unknown. The tenant often does
not have a sufficiently well known and positive reputation to encourage
consumer transactions.
Accordingly, consumers attempt to rely on the reputation of cyber-mall
operators. In fact, consumers are carefully choosing highly reputed online
malls. For example, Rakuten Ichiba (Rakuten), one of the leaders of fierce
competition in electronic commerce in Japan, is a typical illustration of an
online shopping mall functioning as a reputational intermediary.'36 Rakuten
implemented a strong policy that only business firms and carefully selected
individual business owners are entitled to be tenants of the mall. 137 Rakuten
carefully audits firms before the mall approves them as tenants. After
approval, each tenant must comply with the standardized business process in
accordance with the Rakuten Merchant Server (RMS). 38
Yahoo! Shopping presents another illustration. 139  A merchant who
desires to build an online store in Yahoo! Shopping must participate in
Yahoo! Small Business. Yahoo! Small Business includes Yahoo! Merchant
Solutions, a suite of online tools for creating and managing an e-commerce
web site.140 A merchant must agree with the Yahoo! Small Business Terms
of Service before commencing business.' 4 ' A Merchant Solution customer
must read, understand, and agree with Yahoo! Privacy Policy, 142 Yahoo!
136 See generally Rakuten Ichiba Website, Homepage, at http://www.rakuten.co.jp (last visited Oct.
24, 2004) [hereinafter Rakuten Homepage].
137 See id. (indicating the application and approval process of a prospective tenant of the Rakuten
Ichiba Website).
138 See id.
139 See Yahoo! Shopping Website, Homepage, at http://www.shopping.yahoo.com (last visited Oct.
24, 2004).
140 See Yahoo! Small Business Website, Homepage, at http://smallbusiness.yahoo.com (last visited
Oct. 11, 2004). See also Yahoo! Small Business Merchant Solutions, Getting Started Guide, at
http://us.dl .yimg.conVdownload.yahoo.condl/smbiz/doc/ms gettingstarted guide.pdf(last visited Oct.
11,2004).
141 Yahoo! Small Business Website, Yahoo! Consolidated Terms of Service, at
http://smallbusiness.yahoo.com/tos/tos.php (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
142 Yahoo! Privacy Website, Yahoo! Privacy Policy: Yahoo! Privacy Center, at
http://privacy.yahoo.com/privacy/us (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
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Small Business Email Guidelines, 4 3 and Yahoo! Store Guidelines.
Merchants must comply with the standards found in the Yahoo! Store
Guidelines.' Failure to comply with the guidelines may result in removal
from the Yahoo! network. 145
Consumers have two advantages when they transact with a reputable
online shopping mall. First, since more tenants are joining such online
shopping malls, consumers are more likely to find goods they want to buy.
Second, and more importantly, consumers think that each tenant shop is
reliable, so long as the reputed online shopping malls maintained a good
reputation by only selecting trustworthy tenants. 146 Consumers assume that
a fraudulent tenant would immediately disappear from online shopping malls
because the online shopping mall operator would recognize that the success
of the mall depends upon the reputation of the tenants as well as the
operator. In fact, typical cyber-tenant agreements include various clauses that
prohibit tenants from acting in anyway that would adversely affect the online
shopping mall; breach of the covenants will immediately trigger the
termination of the tenant agreement. 147 Because an online shopping operator
is so keen to its own reputation, it rigorously evaluates the tenant's reputa-
tion. In sum, a typical online shopping mall with the credit card system as
a payment tool has the following bilateral incentives using reputation as
bonds (informal relation-preserving stage): (i) buyers verify the information
asserted by tenants through the reputation of an online shopping mall, and
(ii) tenants verify buyers by way of the credit card authorization mechanism.
143 See Yahoo! Website, Yahoo! Mail Additional Terms of Service and Guideline, at
http://docs.yahoo.com/info/guidelines/mail.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2004); Yahoo! Website, Yahoo!
Business Email, Additional Terms of Service, at http://order.sbs.yahoo.cont/sbs/tos/bmail_tos.html (last visited
Oct. 11, 2004).
I" Yahoo! Small Business Store Website, Yahoo! Store: Yahoo! Store Guidelines, at
http://store.yahoo.com/vw/guide.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
145 Id.
146 For example, the Rakuten's tenant policy permits only a "carefully selected individual business
owner" to be a tenant. See generally Rakuten Homepage, supra note 136. Similarly, Yahoo! Shopping
implemented the Merchant Ratings and Reviews system. This helps users make informed decisions and
improve the Yahoo! shopping experience. Merchant star ratings provide "at-a-glance" information about
how other users feel about a merchant based on a 1 to 5 star scale. Merchant reviews are written by users
that provide more details about their experience with a particular merchant. SeeYahoo! Shopping Website,
Yahoo! Merchant Review Guidelines, at http://shopping.yahoo.com/merchrating/general-info.html (last
visited Oct. 11, 2004).
147 See Electronic Commerce Promotion Council ofJapan (ECOM) Homepage, ModelAgreements
for Cybermall -Report 2 (1.0 Version) (1998), located within http://www.ecom.jp/qecom/ecom_e/index.html
(last visited Oct. 11, 2004). See also Yahoo! Website, Terms of Service, at http://docs.yahoo.conVinfo/terms/
(last visited Feb. 15, 2005).
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In addition, online shopping malls need to be equipped with additional
incentive devices so that they can offer an informal end-game dispute
resolution (informal end-game stage). First, as previously discussed, a credit
card chargeback system works as the incentive for substantive contract
performance. Second, online mall operators offer the consumer a protection
policy in which the operators act as adjudicators. Yahoo! Shopping's Yahoo!
Buyer Protection Program is a typical example. 148  Within sixty days of
purchase, a buyer may file a complaint with supporting documents to Yahoo!
Shopping if the buyer believes he or she is a victim of fraud and fails to
resolve the matter with merchants. 149  To protect buyers, prospective
merchants must be covered merchants that earn and maintain a "minimum
3-star average merchant rating.,' 50 After the buyer makes the complaint,
Yahoo! Shopping's Complaint Resolution Process ("the Resolution Process")
handles the claim. The claim administrator investigates the sale and makes
a decision within forty-five days of the receipt of the claim.' 5' Measures
taken in the Resolution Process are drastic. If the merchant fails to resolve
the complaint or to respond within three business days, Yahoo! may take
measures to remove the merchant from Yahoo! Shopping, and may even
proceed with a complaint in the Yahoo! Buyer Protection Program. 52 After
all steps are taken, if Yahoo! determines "in its sole discretion that the
customer has a legitimate claim against the merchant, the customer can apply
for reimbursement through the Yahoo! Buyer Protection Program if
applicable."'' 5 3  This system ultimately supports the full satisfaction of a
buyer's claim if his or her claim is determined as positive.
5 4
148 See generally Yahoo! Shopping Help Website, Yahoo! Shopping Help FAQ: Yahoo! Buyer Protection
Program, at http://help.yahoo.com/help/us/shop/protection (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
149 Yahoo! Shopping Help Website, What Purchases Are Covered By The Yahoo! Buyer Protection
Program?, at http://help.yahoo.com/help/us/shop/shop-76.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2004). Before filing
a claim, the buyer must (i) attempt to communicate directly with the merchant to resolve the problem,
and (ii) ask a credit card company to resolve the problem if the buyer is unable to resolve the matter with
the merchant. Yahoo! Shopping Help Website, How Does the Buyer Protection Program Work?, at
http://help.yahoo.conVhelp/us/shop/shop-77.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
150 Yahoo! Shopping Help Website, What is the Buyer Protection Program?, at
http://help.yahoo.com/help/us/shop/shop-75.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
151 Yahoo! Shopping Help Website, How Does the Buyer Protection Program Work?, at
http://help.yahoo.com/help/us/shop/shop-77.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
152 Yahoo! Help Website, What is the Yahoo! Complaint Resolution Process for the Buyer Protection
Program?, at http://help.yahoo.com/help/us/shop/shop-81.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
153 Id.
154 See Yahoo! Media Relations Website, Yahoo! Launches Yahoo! Buyer Protection Program, at
http://docs.yahoo.com/docs/pr/release631.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
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2. E-MARKETPLACES---ESCROW SERVICES
Probably the most common many-to-many transaction occurs in an e-
marketplace. The typical e-marketplace is an open platform that is shared
and participated in by multiple sellers and buyers. 15 5 E-marketplace operators
mainly provide negotiation places, but in many cases do not enter into
transactions by themselves. 156 A negotiation occurs in the online marketplace
between a seller and a buyer that post offers. If the negotiation is successful,
the parties ultimately enter into a sales contract. 157 The e-marketplace, in a
broad sense, has two classifications. First, the auction site, such as eBay
158
and Priceline.com, has two stages of incentives that facilitate electronic
commerce by enabling contracting parties to verify each other. Reputational
bonds are a first step incentive in the relation-preserving stage, and
alternative dispute resolution systems are a second step incentive in the end-
game stage. Second, business-to-business e-marketplaces, such as The
155 See Electronic Commerce Promotion Council ofJapan (ECOM) Homepage, Market Research
on Electronic Commerce (2001), located within http://www.ecom.or.jp/ecom_e/index.html (last visited Oct.
24, 2004) (consisting of ajoint research by Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Electronic
Commerce Promotion Council ofJapan (ECOM), and NTT Date Institute of Management Consulting,
Inc).
15s6 Sun Microsystems describes e-marketplaces from the vertical, horizontal, and supply chain
perspective.
A vertical e-marketplace provides goods and services to a specific industry .... Vertical e-
marketplace technology should strive to provide a particular industry with a neutral platform
for providing an automated Internet transaction-based model for made-to-order products. It
should enable participating companies to develop better supply chain management, which can
significantly reduce costs and enhance supplier relationships, or improve inventory manage-
ment of raw and finished goods. A horizontal e-marketplace strives for the same overall goals
but provides goods and services across many industries rather than a single one. Examples of
horizontal e-marketplaces include systems set up for payment services, logistics services, and
office supplies.
Sun Microsystems Website, Types of E-Marketplaces, 5 Sun Journal No. 2, at
http://www.sun.com/executives/sunjournaVv5n2/feature4.html#2 (last visited Oct. 11, 2004). Finally,
the enterprise supply chain marketplaces "enable an enterprise to deliver the right products at the right
time to the right customer. A supply chain e-marketplace typically engages many large software
components, including e-procurement and e-distribution modules." Id.
157 In this respect, there seems to be no distinct difference between the basic function of the
marketplace and the auction site. However, this article differentiates between the two. The latter is a
typical auction site where a bidder, submitting the highest or lowest price, will contract with the counter-
party. On the other hand, the former is a business-to-business negotiation platform where contracting
parties desire to write relatively discrete contracts.
1s See eBay Website, Homepage, at http://www.ebay.com (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
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WorldWide Retail Exchange (WWRE) 59 and GlobalNetXchange (GNX),6 °
primarily seek to reduce direct costs of transactions such as delivery,
transportation, or other administrative costs.
Payment and delivery conditions differ according to the type of trans-
action. In some transactions, payment and delivery conditions are pre-deter-
mined via offline negotiations, where the primary role of the e-marketplace
is to provide an administration platform rather than actual contract
formation. However, merely providing an opportunity for low-cost admini-
stration does not make e-marketplaces attractive. Transactors that desire to
construct business models over many-to-many transactions will encounter
the problem of how to create bilateral incentives. So far, many electronic
commerce operators have tried to develop efficient bilateral incentive
mechanisms, since the critical problem with e-marketplaces is that both a
buyer and a seller are in a stranger-to-stranger relationship without having
sufficient information about each other.
E-marketplace owners first attempt to provide reputational bonding tools
so that players might easily verify information with respect to their
transactions. They may first attempt to limit the players to sophisticated
firms, but this would limit business expansion. Therefore, e-marketplace
operators seek an alternative reputational intermediary on which each
member can rely. E-marketplace operators may try to become intermediaries
by intervening in transaction streams. 161 However, they may have difficulty
when they are not able to monitor effectively both sellers and buyers. Thus,
e-marketplace operators seek a third-party informational intermediary. E-
marketplace operators request the intermediary to offer a bilateral incentive
mechanism to enhance or secure contract performance and provide fair
distribution of costs and benefits in dispute resolutions. An example of this
is using an escrow service.
159 See Worldwide Retail Exchange Website, WWRE Overview, at
http://www.worldwideretailexchange.org/cs/en/aboutwwre/overview.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
The Worldwide Retail Exchange Website (WWRE) is the premier Internet-based business-to-business
exchange for retailers and suppliers, which primarily aims to facilitate, simplify, and rationalize trans-
actions between manufacturers, retailers and suppliers. It currently consists of members from Africa, Asia,
Europe, North America and South America with combined annual revenue of more than U.S. $900
billion.
160 See GlobalNetXchange Website, Homepage, at https://www.gnx.com/home.jsp (last visited Oct.
11, 2004). "[GlobalNetXchange] is an e-business solution and service provider for the global retail
industry." Id. GlobalNetXchange (GNX) assists retailers, manufacturers and their trading partners,
including many of the world's largest retailers and manufacturers, in reducing their transaction costs and
improving efficiency by streamlining and automating sourcing and supply chain processes.
161 Yahoo! Shopping's Buyers Protection Program is one example of how a site owner becomes
an intermediary, but Yahoo! does not intervene in a transaction stream as a contracting party itself.
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Escrow Services: An escrow scheme is one of the most popular incentive
mechanisms in many-to-many transactions. 162  In this escrow account
scheme, a seller and a buyer appoint an independent third party as an escrow
agent who retains the payment until delivery and inspection are confirmed.
An escrow agent is generally an agent of both a seller and a buyer."6 The
seller has no delivery obligation if the buyer does not pay the purchase price
to the escrow agent. On the other hand, if the seller does not deliver the
goods, the buyer terminates the contract and gets the money back from the
escrow agent. 164
The escrow mechanism will provide a buyer with the chance to inspect
goods delivered in the presence of an escrow agent, so that the buyer may
significantly reduce risks of imperfect performance. The escrow agent
refunds the purchase money to the buyer when the seller does not deliver the
goods in accordance with the contract terms. The buyer may then withhold
the payment until the completion of inspection. The seller, on the other
hand, secures the purchase price through the escrow mechanism, so that the
seller may have a payment condition similar to cash on delivery. 6'
In order to achieve risk-minimizing structures, many-to-many business
models often utilize escrow services provided by independent electronic
commerce operators. However, online escrow services have "failed to gain
much of a foothold because of their higher costs, despite the greater protec-
tions they offer."166 If a transaction is an as is sale, like many secondhand
marketplace transactions, the quality of goods will be of little importance.
While escrow services seek greater protection of buyers sacrificing sellers,
buyers in fact do not desire a stronger bonding mechanism than those offered
by credit card systems.
More importantly, an escrow provides an incentive mechanism before
delivery, but offers no incentive after delivery is complete. Although an
escrow service keeps purchase money in an escrow account and does not pay
the money to a seller until the completion of inspections, the service no
longer offers any informal dispute resolution system once the purchase
money is paid. Further, contracting parties must prepare a more complete
and discrete agreement when they use an escrow service, because a third
party inspector must rely on a discrete rule in determining whether the buyer
162 For example, Escrow.com is an entity engaged in the escrow business in electronic commerce.
See Escrow.com Website, Honsepage, at http://www.escrow.com (last visited Sept. 11, 2004).
163 See Fisher v. Comer Plantation, Inc., 772 So. 2d 455, 468 (Ala. 2000).
164 See generally Escrow.com Website, Process Overview: Guiding Buyers and Sellers Safely Through the
Online Escrow Process, at https://www.escrow.com/solutions/escrow/process.asp (last visited Oct. 11,2004).
165 See generally Sorkin, supra note 89.
16 Id. at 30.
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executed a complied delivery. Ironically, contract drafting costs are generally
higher in electronic commerce, which causes difficulty in creating complete
agreements.
3. AuCTION SITES-FEEDBACK SYSTEMS AND ONLINE PAYMENT
SYSTEMS
Auction sites are the leading exponents of e-marketplaces, and now they
are widely reputed all over the world. eBay, a leading auction site in the
United States, boasts more than ninety-five million registered users on a
worldwide basis. 16 7 In a typical auction site, contracting parties are strangers.
Thus, auction players are required to confirm each other's assertions through
verification systems. Since an auction site anticipates a contract between two
unknown individuals, its operator tries to establish reputational verification
tools. An efficient system of reputational verification is a key for their
success.
Feedback Systems: In an online auction, a feedback system offers an
incentive mechanism. The system provides both sellers and bidders with an
online bulletin board to post information about transactions formatted
through the Web site. This gives potential subsequent traders the tools to
evaluate the reputation of parties with whom they wish to transact. eBay
provides an extensive feedback system where every eBay user has a "Feed-
back Profile" made up of comments from other eBay users. 8 Before a
bidder bids on an item, the bidder can check the seller's feedback rating.
Sellers can also view the feedback profiles of bidders to see how reliable they
have been in the past. Similarly, other Web sites such as Epinion.com,'
69
Yahoo! Shopping Auction, 170 and Amazon.com 171 provide feedback systems
that permit users to post their transactional experiences.
167 Registered users of eBay grew from two million in December 31, 1998 to ninety-five million
in December 31, 2003. eBay Website, eBay Annual Report 2003, located within
http://investor.ebay.com/annual.cfm (last visited Oct. 11, 2004) [hereinafter eBay Annual Report 2003].
Among ninety-five million registered users, nearly forty-one million were active users, as compared to
28 million active users at the conclusion of 2002. Id., located within http://investor.ebay.com/annual.cfm.
168 See eBay Website, Feedback Forumn, at http://pages.ebay.conm/services/forum/feedback.html (last
visited Sept. 11, 2004).
169 See Epinions.com Website, Homepage, at http://www.epinions.com (last visited Oct. 24,2004).
170 See Yahoo Shopping Auctions Website, Yahoo Auctions, at
http://list.auctions.shopping.yahoo.com (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
171 See generally Amazon.com Website, Amazon.com Auctions, at
http://s1.amazon.com/exec/varzea/subst/home/home.html/103-2368185-6545437 (last visited Oct. 11,
2004).
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eBay's feedback system has two distinct characteristics. First, the rate of
neutral and negative comments is much lower than that of positive
comments. As reported by Paul Resnick and Richard Zeckhauser, the
feedback provided by buyers using eBay was 99.1% positive, 0.6% negative,
and 0.3% neutral.'72 Similarly, sellers using eBay provided feedback that was
98.1% positive, 1.6% negative, and 0.3% neutral. 73 The other characteristic
is the high rate of bidders and purchasers who post feedback comments. A
survey showed that 52.1% of bidders and 60.6% of purchasers commented
through the Feedback Forum of eBay's Web site. 1
74
These figures imply that users often overestimate the rating of another
party's reputation because these are accounted for by a norm of reciprocity,
where a repeat player is encouraged to post positive feedback for his
counterpart in order to elicit a similar response from his counterpart.1 75
While information posted on the Feedback Forum may not always reflect the
true disclosure, the forum is still an efficient device to evaluate the risk of
prospective transactions. 7 6 Users believe that Feedback Forum ratings can
approximately predict the probability that obligations are performed
substantively. 7 7 For users, accuracy of information is not necessarily crucial
because transactions in auction sites are often as is transactions, and most
users of auction sites are probably risk seeking rather than risk averse. If a
player has no negative remark in his past transaction record, other members
will perceive him as one with whom it is feasible to transact.
It is assumed that the feedback system successfully fulfills two conditions
required for reputation functioning as a hostage. First, it offers a
communication place to which reputation is disseminated at minimal costs.
Second, it establishes a reputation verification standard that primarily focuses
on expelling bad guys from the auction site.
172 Paul Resnick & Richard Zeckhauser, Trust Among Strangers in Internet Transactions: Empirical
Analysis of eBay's Reputation System, at 11 (working paper for NEBR workshop), at
http://www.si.umich.edu/-presnick/papers/ebayNBER/RZNBERBodegaBay.pdf (last visited Oct. 11,
2004) [hereinafter Resnick & Zeckhauserl.
173 Id. at 11.
174 Id.
175 Cf. Clayton P. Gillette, Reputation and Intermediaries in Electronic Commerce, 62 LA. L. REV. 1165
(2002). There are several explanations as to why users are likely to overestimate. Gillette argues that
eBay's instruction to deter defamatory comments might reduce negative comments. Nonetheless,
according to Gillette, ease of legal obligation against defamation does not necessarily encourage more
accurate and truthful comments because of a herd behavior that the mere presence of multiple negative
comments is likely to overstate a trader's low quality-users who found a trader's previous negative
information in the Feedback Forum were more willing to attribute a bad transactional result to that trader.
Id. at 1191.
176 See generally id.
177 See generally Resnick & Zeckhauser, supra note 172.
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Online Payment Systems: While a feedback system provides a contracting
party with a chance to evaluate a counter-party's reputation, its incentive
mechanisms only serve relation-preserving norms. Although contracting
parties need additional informal end-game norms, credit card payments have
relatively smaller market share in online auctions. Because auctions are in
most cases individual-to-individual transactions, individuals have difficulty
in obtaining merchant accounts that enable them to accept payments by
credit cards.'78 Instead, contracting parties use an online payment service as
an incentive. 179 In fact, eBay utilizes PayPal, a subsidiary of eBay, as a pay-
ment service intermediary.' 0 Yahoo! and Amazon.com operate their own
payment service providers. 8 ' These online payment services offer an incen-
tive in which the service providers function as both reputational inter-
mediaries at the informal relation-preserving stage, and dispute mediators at
the informal end-game stage. In this sense, the provider's service is similar
to that of the credit card system. However, because the online payment
service is not regulated, different service providers can arrange different
terms and conditions for sellers and buyers.
PayPal is a leading company in online payment solution services,
operating in thirty-eight countries with over forty million members.8 2 A
seller and a buyer must sign up for a PayPal account in order to send or
178 See National Consumers League Online Auctions Website, Online Auction's 2001 Survey:
Summary of Findings, at http://www.nclnet.org/shoppingonline/auctionsurvey.htm (2001) (noting that in
only 17% of the transactions did the buyer give his credit card number directly to the seller). See also,
Sorkin, supra note 89 at 7.
179 See National Consumers League Online Auctions Website, Online Auction's 2001 Survey:
Summary of Findings at http://www.nclnet.org/shoppingonline/auctionsurvey.htm (2001) (noting that 44%
ofthose who bought items through auction sites used payment services offered by or through auction sites
that facilitated payment by credit card).
180 See PayPal Website, Homepage, at http://www.paypal.com (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
1is See Sorkin, supra note 89.
182 PayPal currently offers its services to users in 38 countries, including the United States. See
eBay Annual Report 2003, supra note 167, located within http://investor.ebay.com/annual.cfm. In fact:
[djuring 2003, over $12.2 billion in total payment volume, or TPV, was transacted on the
PayPal platform, consisting primarily of payment to individuals and small businesses trading
on eBay and various other online shopping sites. As of December 31, 2003, PayPal had
40 million accounts, compared to 23 million accounts at December 31, 2002.
PayPal has achieved its rapid growth by delivering a combination of user
convenience, competitive pricing and customer safeguards. During the year ended
December 31, 2003, PayPal's total number of accounts grew by 17 million, an average of
46,000 per day. During this same period, PayPal processed an average of 629,000 payments per
day, averaging $33.5 million in daily payment volume, with an average payment of $53 sent
during this period.
Id., located within http://investor.ebay.com/annual.cfm.
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receive payments through the service. 83  After signing up for a PayPal
account, the buyer needs to add a funding source for payments, such as a
credit or debit card. The buyer then enters the payment amount and his or
her email address."8 The payment that the seller receives is automatically
reflected in the seller's PayPal account balance."' The seller may use the
balance for various purposes, such as sending a payment to someone else,
using a PayPal virtual debit card to shop anywhere online, opening a money
market reserve fund to earn a return on the PayPal balance, and withdrawing
the money to a bank account.
186
Both the seller and the buyer can verify the reliability of each other
through the function of a payment service provider. The payment service
provider acts as a reputational intermediary, serving informal relation-
preserving norms. The PayPal User Agreement provides that PayPal may set
a limit or refuse to provide services to a member, if the member harms
PayPal.187  In addition, online payment services work as a third party
adjudicator that informally settles disputes between sellers and buyers. Sets
of rules in the dispute resolution system constitute informal end-game
norms. For example, PayPal's Buyer Claimant Policy indicates that PayPal
will try to help buyers recover funds from non-complying sellers, and help
complying sellers reduce risk of chargeback "' The policy also provides that
PayPal is entitled to investigate an underlying transactional dispute upon
receiving a chargeback claim from the buyer. If the seller cannot present
sufficient evidence, PayPal is entitled to collect the amount the buyer paid
from the seller.
189
183 See generally PayPal Website, Help Center, at http://www.paypal.com/cgi-




187 Section 11 of the PayPal User Agreement provides for PayPal's remedial rights as follows:
[w]ithout limiting other remedies, we may update inaccurate or incorrect information you
provide to us, contact you by means other than electronically, immediately warn our
community of your actions, place a hold on funds in your account, limit funding sources and
payments, limit access to an account and any or all of the account's functions (including but
not limited to the ability to send money or making withdrawals from the account), limit
withdrawals, indefinitely suspend or close your account and refuse to provide our Services to
you.
PayPal Website, User Agreement for PayPal Service, at http://www.paypal.com/cgi-
bin/webscr?cmd=p/gen/ua/ua-outside (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
188 PayPal Website, Buyer Complaint Policy, at http://www.paypal.com/cgi-
bin/webscr?cmd=p/gen/ua/policy buyercomplaint-outside (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
189 Id.
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4. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-DSCRETE MEMBER AGREEMENTS
A transaction by use of negotiable instruments is one of the most com-
plicated types of many-to-many electronic commerce. 190 It is complicated
because one negotiable instrument represents rights and obligations of all
parties in a transactional chain.
Despite the complexity of negotiable instruments, both Electronic
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (E-Sign) and Uniform
Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) provide legal support for the creation,
transferability, and enforceability of electronic records. 191 The key terms for
electronic negotiable instruments are transferable record and control.'92 The
transferable record is an electronic equivalent of a paper note or document. 93
For an electronic record to qualify as the transferable record, its issuer must
expressly agree that the electronic record is to be considered a transferable
record. Control, the other key term, acts as a substitute for possession in the
paper world. 94 Control requirements are satisfied "if a system employed for
evidencing the transfer of interests in the transferable record reliably
establishes that person as the person to which the transferable record was
issued or transferred."
195
Although E-Sign and UETA have opened the door to the use of
electronic negotiable instruments, these instruments seem to be premature
and are still under development. 96 These Acts do not address issues related
to endorser liability, warranty liability, and effects of taking a transferable
record on the underlying obligation. 97 Instead, the contract must address
these issues and bind any player in the chain of transactions.' 98 Current
technology "[does] not try to create a new mechanism approximating
possession of a piece of paper as a system for tracking ownership." In order
to satisfy the control requirement of these acts, they require a trusted third
party registry system that administrates and stores transferable records. 9  In
190 See Jane Kaufman Winn, Couriers Without Luggage: Negotiable Instruments and Digital Signatures,
49 S.C. L. Rev. 739 (1998);Jane Kaufman Winn, Whatls a Transferable Record and Who Cares?, 7 B.U.J. SCI.
& TECH. L. 203 (2001) [hereinafter Winn, What is a Transferable Record and Who Cares]. See also Maggs,
supra note 3 (presenting a general discussion of negotiable instruments).
191 See 15 U.S.C. S 7021 (2000); Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) S 16.
192 See UETA § 16.
193 See 15 U.S.C. S 7021; UETA S 16(a).
194 See UETA § 16, Comment 3.
19 15 U.S.C. 5 7021(b); UETA S 16(a).
19 See Winn, What is a Transferable Record and Who Cares?, supra note 190.
197 UETA 16, Comment 4.
198 Id.
199 See Winn, What is a Transferable Record and Who Cares?, supra note 190.
212 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 13:161
any event, some contract arrangements are necessary for implementing
business models with electronic negotiable instruments. This implies that
only players bound by a member agreement can be prospective users of
electronic negotiable instruments.
Despite the above difficulty, some businesses have already started pilot
operations. One of the most large-scale attempts at establishing electronic
negotiable instruments is found in real world export and import practices.20 °
In Europe, Bolero.net is trying to achieve this purpose through the
company's Trusted Trade Platform. 201 The Trusted Trade Platform provides
a basic infrastructure to exchange electronic trade documents via the
Internet.2  The Bolero Bill of Lading is "created, transferred, and surren-
dered" through the Trusted Trade Platform.0 3 The Bolero Title Registry
provides a repository and workflow for the creation and transfer of negotiable
title documents, and therefore allows transactors to exchange the rights and
obligations contained in a Bolero Bill of Lading.20 4 The Bolero Title Registry
and the Bolero Bill of Lading "provide a fully functional equivalent to the
paper Bill of Lading.
2 5
As a contractual structure, Bolero established the Rulebook, a contractu-
ally binding set of rules that all users of the Bolero service are required to
sign. 206 This Rulebook is "a muli-lateral contract that binds each user to
every other user in relation to their use of the Bolero service. "2°v It provides
necessary terms and conditions that codify the key elements of the Bolero
200 See Chester D. Hopper, Carriage of Goods and Charter Parties, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1697, 1729-30
(1999) (discussing electronic bills of lading).
201 See Bolero Website, Homepage, at www.bolero.net (last visited Oct. 11, 2004). See also Bolero
Association Website, at http://www.boleroassociation.org (last visited Oct. 11, 2004). Bolero "is a neutral
secure platform enabling paperless trading between buyers, sellers, and their logistics service and bank
partners." Bolero Website, Homepage, at www.bolero.net (last visited Oct. 11, 2004). The platform of
Bolero is operated by Bolero International Limited, with the administrative support of Bolero Association
Limited. Bolero International Limited is responsible for the operation of Bolero.net service. Bolero
Association Limited administers "the enrollment process and the Bolero Rule Book (the governing
document for all users of the Bolero System)," member disciplinary procedures, and other administrative
issues in order to support Bolero.net's goal of creating the electronic alternative to paper-based trade.
Bolero Association Website, Homepage, at http://www.boleroassociation.org (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
202 See Bolero Website, Solutions: Bolero's Trusted Trade Platform, at
http://www.bolero.netlsolutions/tradeplatform/index.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
203 Boleronet, Solutions: Title Registry, at
http://www.bolero.net/solutions/tradeplatform/titleregistry.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 See Boleronet, Solutions: Rule Book, at
http://www.bolero.net/solutions/trade platform/rulebook.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
2 Id.
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service, including a provision that treats users' electronic communications as
valid and makes a message bearing digital signature legally binding. °8 It also
"provides the legal rules that underpin the system enabling transactions of
the Bolero Bills of Lading ... [and] . . . also includes detailed Operating
Procedures and a few Operational Rules involving precise and technical
points of user-to-user operations."2 °9
Japan has similarly attempted an electronic documentation delivery
system. The Trade Electronic Data Interchange ("TEDI") project is a
government initiative project intending to establish a Japanese standard
model for electronic bills of lading. It is "achieving greatly enhanced
efficiency and reduced costs in trade practices through the computerization
of trade-related documents and the use of the Internet." 210 To ensure the
smooth functioning of the TEDI system, the management entity, Japan
Electronic Trade Service, Inc. ("JETS"), works as a certificate authority
("CA"), which issues public key certification to subscribers for verification
of the electronic signature used on TEDI. It is also expected to work as a
repository service provider ("RSP"), which provides accurate management,
tracks possession transfer, and maintains title holder information for trade
documents, including shipment information documents that provide the
same function as bills of lading.21
As the TEDI system is a trade system relying on participants' relationship
of contracts, users within a trade chain are required to: "(a) exchange
documents and information electronically, (b) be bound by an electronic data
record of the status of goods being shipped in a trade transaction, and (c) to
use certain common protocols and outside service providers to assure
consistency and integrity in the operation of the system." 212 These projects
are aimed to make the export and import documentation process more rapid
through electronic documentation exchange systems. In this respect, the
current electronic documentation delivery system appears to emphasize its
effects on the reduction of ex ante contract documentation costs, together
with other administration costs. Because documents required for shipment,
such as letters of credit and bills of lading, are already standardized offline,
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Japan Electronic Trade Service, Inc., Website, About Service:Japan Electronic Trade Service: The
Strength Behind TEDI, at http://www.jets-tedi.con/e/01/service.htm (last visited Oct. 11,2004). The Trade
Electronic Data Interchange (TEDI) system presupposes trade chains consisting of a seller, a buyer, a
bank, and a carrier.
21 See TEDI-Club Website, Legal Framework at
http://www.tediclub.com/english/project/index2.html.
212 Interchange Agreement is currently at http://www.tedianet.cone/down/downmanual.html
(last visited Oct. 22, 2004).
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electronic commerce is able to incorporate those documentation processes
in its business model. However, it is still questionable whether the cost
reduction by establishing the online documentation process actually
outweighs the increase of costs in building the online system. In particular,
as shipping documents, such as letters of credit and bills of lading, are
supposed to be circulated in a trade chain consisting of a seller, a buyer, and
a carrier, the larger membership is a precondition that the system may be able
to function as a cost reduction device. Thus, it appears that it takes much
longer for the electronic documentation exchange system to attain popularity.
5. SUMMARY
A business model has difficulty in establishing efficient incentive
mechanisms when two innocent parties transact without face-to-face
contact. 213 How does the model encourage two innocent parties to shake
hands? Currently, businesspersons are developing two different strategies.
One is to reduce ex ante costs by managing administration processes
effectively. The other is to provide businesses with incentives to create trans-
actions. If formal legal enforcement is relatively difficult because of high
drafting costs and high enforcement costs, contracting parties are more likely
to seek alternative informal norms created by incentive mechanisms. Typical
auction sites, such as eBay, are keen to establish optimal bilateral incentives,
such as an online payment system and a feedback mechanism.
On the other hand, the business-to-business type of business models in
many-to-many transactions is more likely to focus on reducing administra-
tive costs rather than deploying incentives. Indeed, leading e-marketplace
sites and electronic negotiable instrument providers seek to establish open-
end EDI platforms by enhancing administration tools.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has identified various incentives underlying currently pre-
vailing business models for electronic commerce. Institutional analysis of
business models provides a clue to the contracting parties' intentions in
creating contracts. The Internet's global and automated nature made low-
value, stranger-to-stranger, and long-distance transactions possible, but these
213 Indeed, most of consumer frauds have occurred in many-to-many transactions. The National
Consumers League's Internet Fraud Watch (IFW) reported that the amount of consumer fraud reported
to IFW reached $14 million in 2002, "with more than $13 million in losses in the online auction category
alone." National Consumers League Website, Online Auctions Dominant Consumer Fraud, at
http://nclnet.org/internetfraud02.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).
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transactions made both ex ante contract specification and expost enforcement
difficult, and increased the possibility for opportunism. Based on this under-
standing, business models of electronic commerce are classified according to
which costs, ex ante or ex post, are emphasized as a target of cost engineering.
This article revealed that a typical business-to-consumer business model
emphasizes its cost reduction targets on expost enforcement costs. In order
for business models to function in stranger-to-stranger, low-value circum-
stances, those models often have two stages of incentives, namely the relation
preserving incentive, and the end game incentive.
Two stages of incentives create two stages of informal norms. The first
norm utilizes a reputational bond that gives contracting parties an efficient
tool to properly evaluate risks in underlying transactions, and encourage
substantive contract performance (informal relation-preserving norm). For
example, a simple online shopping site, one of the most common examples
of one-to-many transactions, may be more successful if the site owner is a
reputed enterprise that already obtained a high reputation with the historical
success of its offline business. Consumers feel that the reputed enterprise
will try to resolve the dispute faithfully for fear of the informal sanction of
reputational damage.
However, the offline reputation of a site owner is not a perfect assurance
mechanism. Contracting parties seek an additional assurance mechanism so
that buyers may be able to settle a dispute at the end-game stage at lower
costs. In this context, a traditional paper-based alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) does not function effectively in electronic commerce because an
additional offline procedure is likely to destroy the electronic commerce
advantage where whole procedures are completed online. For this reason,
electronic commerce must employ online ADR in its online transactional
procedure. As the third party adjudicator is also an independent party with
his own interest, norms that apply to the dispute are likely to be informal
rather than formal (informal end-game norm).
Nevertheless, this does not mean that a formal legal enforcement is no
longer necessary in electronic commerce. Even though contracting parties
rely on informal norms, a party may seek formal legal enforcement when the
other party acts opportunistically. Accordingly, the unique nature of the
incentive type of business model is its two steps in end-game norms. When
a consumer requests a chargeback to a card issuer in a credit card transaction,
the card issuer often accepts the chargeback and asks the merchant to provide
evidence of its substantive performance. When the merchant fails to show
the sufficient evidence, the card issuer then does a chargeback to the
merchant (informal first end-game norm). However, if the merchant finds
that the consumer tries to exploit the system by using informal norms, the
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merchant often wants courts to enforce strict formal norms (formal second
end-game norm).
Consequently, business models of electronic commerce often have three
stages of dispute-resolution where contracting parties try to achieve an
optimal balance between formal and informal norms. Contracting parties
adjust themselves to a risk verifiable situation via bilateral incentive
mechanisms. Business models of electronic commerce are cleverly designed
to reflect such demand for efficient incentive mechanisms.
This total mechanism of efficient allocation between formal and informal
norms in electronic commerce mayjustify courts' formalistic interpretation
of a website's displayed legal terms. Courts must be more concerned that
intervening in online contracts may destroy the optimal balance between the
formal and informal norms and ultimately hinder the sound development of
transactions. Courts should also be sensitive to the background mechanism
of business models. As the contract formation process in electronic com-
merce is automated, with no human intervention, an electronic commerce
operator often expresses its intent for online transactions through incentive
mechanisms within its business model. Thus, in deciding whether there has
been exploitation, courts must consider whether legal terms are well
designed under the overall system of incentives embedded in the adopted
business model.
